Taiwan holds its ground in South China Sea

Taiwan can play a key role in easing tensions and building mutual trust in the disputed South China Sea.

According to The Straits Times, the navies of the Philippines, Australia, and Canada conducted a joint sail in the South China Sea on August 19. This activity prompted a response from China, which launched a “routine patrol” in the contested waters as a show of deterrence. The patrol coincided with the PLA’s large-scale military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in World War II.

On September 9, China’s State Council approved the establishment of the “Huangyan Island National Nature Reserve,” stating that it aims to "strengthen supervision and law enforcement" against all types of illegal activities related to the protected area. Both Taiwan and the Philippines have protested against China's move.

The situation in the South China Sea remains deeply concerning, with ongoing tensions rooted in unresolved historical disputes. As a stakeholder in the region, Taiwan is well-positioned to contribute to de-escalation efforts and foster momentum for peace.

Taiwan’s historical claims and strategic legacy

Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are anchored in both historical precedent and legal reasoning. In 1947, the Republic of China (ROC) published the “eleven-dash line” map, which formed the basis of its maritime claims.

After 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopted a revised version—removing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin—to create today’s “nine-dash line.”

Professor Wang Kuan-Hsiung (王冠雄) of National Taiwan Normal University told TCN that although the ROC and PRC maps appear similar, they differ significantly in detail and this divergence is documented in the U.S. Department of State’s “Limits in the Seas” report.

Several historical accounts highlight the role Taiwan played in the South China Sea during the Cold War era.

In 1956, when Filipino adventurer Tomás Cloma attempted to claim portions of the Spratly Islands, Taiwan responded promptly. The ROC government lodged a diplomatic protest, dispatched naval patrols, and intercepted Cloma’s vessel near North Danger Reef.

Weapons were confiscated, and Cloma’s brother—the ship’s captain—admitted to unauthorized entry. This episode underscored Taiwan’s active enforcement of its maritime claims, a position it has never formally renounced.

Another case involves Zhongye Island, one of the largest naturally formed features in the Spratly Islands. The ROC maintained control of the island until 1970, when Taipei ordered a temporary troop withdrawal to nearby Taiping Island for safety.

The Philippines subsequently occupied Zhongye Island and has maintained control since then. Nonetheless, Taiwan has never relinquished its claim to sovereignty over the island.

Today, Taiwan continues to exercise effective control over both Taiping (Itu Aba) Island and the Dongsha (Pratas) Islands. These positions provide Taiwan with strategic leverage to influence—and potentially control—critical maritime traffic routes at key chokepoints in the South China Sea.


Strategic modesty: Taiwan’s quiet sssertiveness

Taiwan’s South China Sea policy emphasizes maintaining its presence and asserting legal claims through measured diplomacy and non-provocative actions. 

For instance, when the Philippines passed the Philippine Maritime Zones Act in 2024, extending its EEZ into disputed waters, China responded by declaring new baselines around Scarborough Shoal. Taiwan, however, issued a measured diplomatic protest, opting for stability over confrontation.

Dr. Song Yann-huei (宋燕輝), a former senior fellow at Academia Sinica, told TCN that Taiwan’s low-profile approach should not be mistaken for weakness. In fact, in an increasingly volatile environment, restraint can be a form of strength—especially when paired with consistent legal assertions. He also notes that periods of heightened tension sometimes afford Taiwan rare opportunities to insert itself into the regional narrative.

Crucially, the South China Sea serves as one of Taiwan’s most vital SLOCs. Disruptions to shipping through this region could jeopardize Taiwan’s access to energy resources and trade routes, posing grave national security risks.

Taiwan’s strategic outposts in the South China Sea

Taiwan maintains de facto control over two critical features: the Dongsha Islands and Taiping Island in the Spratlys. Although smaller in scope compared to the holdings of other claimants, these outposts offer Taiwan strategic access to key maritime chokepoints.

Taiwan’s operational capacity in the region is constrained by both geographic distance and the sensitivity of cross-Strait relations.

Professor Wang recalled a notable incident during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), when a Taiwan Coast Guard vessel, experiencing mechanical difficulties during a research mission, inadvertently passed within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reef—a feature controlled by China. Wang added that Chinese forces issued no warning, underscoring the nuanced political calculations that shape conduct in these contested waters.

Over the years, Taiwan has steadily strengthened its presence on Taiping Island. President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) launched the “Spratly Initiative,” promoting peaceful dialogue and alignment with international norms.

His successor, President Ma Ying-jeou , advanced this approach with the 2016 “South China Sea Peace Initiative Roadmap,” which advocated joint development and designated Taiping as a hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).

Both Chen and Ma visited Taiping Island during their respective terms, reinforcing Taiwan’s sovereign claims through symbolic political gestures.

Though President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) did not visit Taiping during her tenure, her administration articulated a strategic vision based on freedom of navigation, scientific cooperation, and peaceful dispute resolution. Tsai’s government also called for Taiwan’s inclusion in multilateral frameworks—an unprecedented move.

As of early 2025, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) has yet to outline a new South China Sea policy. His administration currently operates under the strategic framework set by Tsai.


Humanitarian engagement and institutional limitations

Taiwan has made significant strides in transforming Taiping Island into a functional HA/DR base. 

The Coast Guard Administration (CGA) told TCN that former President Tsai Ing-wen, on July 19, 2016, instructed that Taiping Island be developed as a center for humanitarian assistance and a logistical base, in order to demonstrate to the international community the Taiwanese government’s commitment to and involvement in humanitarian relief efforts.

According to information on the CGA website, the agency has since conducted eight large-scale drills covering emergency medicine, maritime surveillance, environmental protection, and search-and-rescue operations.

However, the diplomatic environment—shaped by China’s influence—poses significant challenges for Taiwan in maintaining its sovereignty and enforcement capabilities in the South China Sea. The CGA indicated that Taiwan has been excluded from the negotiations surrounding the South China Sea Code of Conduct and thus holds only limited rights to speak or participate in international forums on the issue. As a result, the CGA noted that Taiwan’s law enforcement operations cannot be effectively coordinated with other countries, and timely logistical support remains difficult to secure.


Taiwan's hidden strenghts in soft power and track-two diplomacy

Despite constraints, Taiwan holds two strategic advantages that are hard for competitors—especially China—to match.

The first is Itu Aba. Accoring to the CGA, the Itu Aba is the only naturally formed island in the Spratlys with fresh water and a functional airstrip and its location near Chinese, Vietnamese, Philippine, and Malaysian outposts makes it a valuable hub for potential regional cooperation.

The second is Taiwan’s international credibility. Professor Wang suggested that Taiwan has earned trust that enables it to engage in Track-Two diplomacy—informal talks on less sensitive issues like marine research and fisheries.

One example, Wang mentioned, is a regional workshop hosted by National Sun Yat-sen University, backed by Taiwan’s National Science and Technology Council in 2017, in which scholars and policymakers from China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines took part. While unofficial, the event fostered rare trust-building and genuine exchange in a region often defined by mistrust, Wang said.


A possible roadmap for Taiwan

Despite progress in Track-Two diplomacy, Taiwan’s potential remains underused. Professor Wang believes these informal initiatives could evolve into Track-One-and-a-Half dialogues, especially in areas like fisheries and environmental monitoring—topics less burdened by sovereignty disputes.

Wang suggested that Taiwan already operates one of the region’s most advanced fishing fleets and maritime monitoring systems and this positions is able to lead regional efforts on sustainable practices, stock assessments, and data sharing—efforts that could eventually support joint patrols and coordinated enforcement.

Dr. Song agrees, noting that scientific cooperation allows Taiwan to lead without escalating tensions. He argues that science-based diplomacy strengthens both regional security and Taiwan’s role in maritime governance.

To fully realize this potential, Taiwan must continue to ground its approach in legal legitimacy, historical precedent, and strategic frameworks like the South China Sea Peace Initiative. As Professor Wang points out, Taiwan’s influence depends on staying present, principled, and engaged.

In a region shaped by rising hard power and zero-sum rivalries, Taiwan’s approach—focused on law, restraint, and humanitarian values—offers a credible and constructive path forward. Far from a fringe actor, Taiwan is a capable stakeholder with the trust, expertise, and vision to help shape the future of the South China Sea.