Taiwan space industry readies for 2028 moonshot

Taiwan is making a shift from semiconductors to space, expanding its budgets and launching satellites, with a lunar mission planned.

For decades, Taiwan's name in technology conjured semiconductors, not satellites. Yet in the past five years, the island has orchestrated a quiet renaissance in space, retooling institutions, expanding budgets, and plotting hardware that ranges from domestic launchers to a first lunar science mission.

The transformation has been incremental rather than bombastic—pragmatic, policy-led, and tethered to national resilience. It is also accelerating.

Two key shifts

Two key changes have shaped Taiwan’s growing space ambitions.

First, the 2021 Space Development Act gave the country its first clear legal framework for launches, licensing, and commercial participation—bringing Taiwan closer to global norms and opening the door for private sector involvement. The following year, the Taiwan Young Space Professionals program launched to attract talent into the emerging industry.

Second, Taiwan overhauled its space agency. In 2023, the National Space Organization (NSPO) was restructured into the Taiwan Space Agency (TASA), with more staff, a broader mandate, and a larger budget. Now directly under the National Science and Technology Council, TASA’s role has expanded beyond research to include strategy, international cooperation, and industrial development.

While it may look like a rebrand, the shift from NSPO to TASA reflects Taiwan’s move from a project-based model to a more systemic approach. The agency is no longer just building satellites—it’s also shaping policy, coordinating with industry, and engaging globally. That demands a wider range of expertise, from export controls to public communication.

From Formosat to Constellations

Taiwan's space program has advanced steadily, built around its Formosat series of Earth-observation and weather satellites. A major milestone came in 2023 with the successful launch of Triton.

The current Phase III of Taiwan’s long-term space roadmap (2019–2028) emphasizes higher-resolution imaging, synthetic-aperture radar, and faster deployment. In 2024, the government proposed extending Phase III to 2031 and adding NT$40 billion (US$1.3 billion) in funding, underscoring the view that space is now strategic infrastructure.

A press release by the Office of the President shresident Lai Ching-te was recently briefed on the progress of Taiwan’s first domestically built satellite constellation, Formosat-8. The first unit, FS-8A, is scheduled to launch in October 2025.

Taiwan’s Beyond 5G (B5G) LEO satellite initiative is a public-private effort aimed at securing indigenous communications in space. Trial satellites are planned for 2027–2028, followed by six operational satellites by 2029.

The goal is to provide reliable backup if undersea cables are severed—whether by accident or during a crisis. The move reflects Taiwan’s increasing concern over communications resilience.

International partnerships are also on the table. Officials from the Taiwan Space Agency (TASA) and the Czech Ministry of Transport have expressed interest in expanded bilateral cooperation, as reported by a TASA newsletter after its delegation was invited to travel to Czechia.

Taiwan is also in talks with Amazon’s Project Kuiper, Taipei Times covered in May 2025. The aim is to complement national capabilities with commercial services where appropriate, forming a hybrid communications architecture.


The Pingtung Decision: Where Rockets Meet Geography

All of this would be academic without a place to launch. In March 2025, after years of technical review and local consultation, Taiwan’s National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) designated Jiupeng Village in Pingtung County’s Manzhou Township as the island’s national launch site.

The choice was strategic. Jiupeng already hosts a missile testing range, with favorable coastal winds, controlled airspace, and existing military-grade infrastructure. These qualities make it ideal for both suborbital tests and future orbital launches.

For Taiwan, which has long relied on foreign sites to launch its satellites, a domestic launch pad is more than symbolic. It represents a hedge against geopolitical risk, a training base for engineers, and a potential anchor for a commercial space ecosystem.

Pingtung officials have begun branding the region as Taiwan’s future space hub. That ambition is now taking shape physically on the ground.

In July 2025, Taiwan inaugurated a research rocket control center and new assembly facility in nearby Hsu Hai Village. NSTC leadership described it as a foundation—not just for competition in space, but for public engagement through a future museum and education center.

While this isn’t yet a fully operational launch center, it lays the groundwork for range operations, safety protocols, and a domestic supply chain. In essence, Taiwan is learning how to launch—and how to build the institutions needed to do so safely and sustainably.

A Spaceport on the Horizon?

The Pingtung plan now intersects with an intriguing U.S. proposal. In late July, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)—Washington’s de facto embassy—raised the idea of “possible spaceport cooperation,” suggesting suborbital point-to-point flights that could cut travel time between Houston and Taipei to around two and a half hours.

Taiwan’s response was cautiously optimistic. Officials welcomed the vision but noted the technology is still in its infancy, the regulatory demands are substantial, and cargo—not passengers—would come first.

Importantly, planners say Pingtung’s layout already includes space for potential expansion into a landing-capable spaceport, if and when that becomes feasible.

Some might dismiss this as sci-fi overreach. But the intent is strategic: Taiwan is designing its infrastructure to remain flexible, avoiding any constraints that might limit future capabilities.

By building in room for emerging technologies, Taiwan is making a small investment now for potentially large dividends later—a measured, forward-looking policy move rather than a leap of ambition.

2028: An Inflection Year down the Road

The year 2028 appears repeatedly in Taiwanese planning documents and public statements as an inflection point rather than a finish line. By then, officials want three things to be true.

First, the national launch center’s core functions should be operational, enabling regular suborbital research launches and incremental steps toward orbital attempts. This is less about headline-grabbing “firsts” and more about building institutional muscle—range safety teams, weather officers, telemetry systems, and other behind-the-scenes capabilities that separate a serious program from a symbolic one. Recent infrastructure developments in Pingtung suggest that this institutionalization is already underway.

Second, the Beyond 5G (B5G) LEO satellite program should have transitioned from planning to deployment. Experimental satellites are expected on orbit by 2027–2028, with production ramping toward a six-satellite constellation by the end of the decade. While not a substitute for global providers, this system would give Taiwan reliable national coverage and emergency surge capacity—a sovereign Plan B for communications.

Third, Taiwan aims to participate in scientific exploration beyond Earth orbit. TASA has announced a first lunar science mission for as early as 2028, partnering with international landers to study mini-magnetospheres, vortex regions, and ultraviolet astronomy. The scientific value is real, but the broader message is clearer: Taiwan intends to contribute to, not just consume, deep-space research.

Meanwhile, NSTC has set 2034 as the target for launching a domestically developed rocket capable of placing a 200 kg payload into orbit.


Industry, Security, and the Crowded Neighborhood

Taiwan’s space calculus is inseparable from its security environment. Satellites have become part of the island’s civil-military fusion for resilience: better weather data for typhoon response, imaging for disaster relief and maritime domain awareness, communications that ride above cable-cutting risks. Analysts note that Phase III of the national program explicitly frames space as protecting “people’s lives and property.”

The diplomatic overlay is equally salient. Taipei is deepening ties with the United States in space policy and technology, from legislative overtures in Washington to AIT’s spaceport musings. These steps have a deterrent subtext: the more Taiwan is intertwined with global space supply chains and norms, the higher the reputational and economic cost of coercion. Partnerships with American primes and startups—radio payloads here, ground systems there—also reduce time-to-capability and seed know-how domestically.

None of this obviates hard problems. Recruiting and retaining specialized engineers when TSMC hoovers up talent is a quotidian challenge. The supply chain for propulsion, avionics, and space-grade materials remains embryonic. And Taiwan’s regulatory posture must strike a delicate equipoise: permissive enough to attract startups and foreign investment, stringent enough to safeguard export controls and national security. 

A Comprehensive View from 2025

Taiwan’s space calculus is inseparable from its security environment. Satellites have become part of the island’s civil-military fusion for resilience: better weather data for typhoon response, imaging for disaster relief and maritime domain awareness, and communications that ride above cable-cutting risks.

Analysts note that Phase III of the national program explicitly frames space as protecting “people’s lives and property.” The diplomatic overlay is equally salient.

Taipei is deepening ties with the US in space policy and technology, from legislative overtures in Washington to AIT’s spaceport musings. These steps have a deterrent subtext: the more Taiwan is intertwined with global space supply chains and norms, the higher the reputational and economic cost of coercion.

Partnerships with American primes and startups, radio payloads here, ground systems there, also reduce time-to-capability and seed know-how domestically. None of this obviates hard problems.

Recruiting and retaining specialized engineers when TSMC hoovers up talent is a quotidian challenge. The supply chain for propulsion, avionics, and space-grade materials remains embryonic. Taiwan’s regulatory posture must strike a delicate balance: permissive enough to attract startups, talents and foreign investment, but stringent enough to safeguard export controls and national security.

An Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) study published in late 2024 stated: The Taiwanese government shows strong determination; efforts should be put into job attractiveness and wages to make space attractive among other science and technology fields.