US and China seek risk control and de-escalation, say experts

Taiwanese international affairs experts suggested that the United States and China are seeking to cool tensions and reduce risks in their relationship following the Trump-Xi meeting.

On November 1, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wrote “the relationship between the United States and China has never been better," on the social media platform X. He and China’s Minister of National Defense, Admiral Dong Jun (董軍) agreed that the US and China “should set up military-to-military channels to deconflict and deescalate any problems that arise,” he added.

Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) is a self-governing democracy that China claims as its own territory, creating a flashpoint in relations between Beijing and the West.

Dr. Alexander C. Huang (黃介正), a professor from Taiwan's Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, told TCN that restoring military-to-military dialogue mechanisms is aimed at risk avoidance and preventing accidents, thereby maintaining a state of de-escalation and reduced pressure between the two sides.

Professor Huang said that having mechanisms to prevent accidents is beneficial to both parties. It is especially beneficial to the US because any unexpected conflict would almost always occur in the Western Pacific, rather than near US territory.

Former Taiwan legislator and current Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Hsu Yu-jen (許毓仁) told TCN that the US and China’s agreement to reopen military-to-military communication channels is intended to de-conflict and de-escalate. It's a crisis-management-level risk-reduction mechanism rather than a policy concession, he added.

Hsu said that these measures help reduce the risk of sudden frictions escalating into conflict and lower the probability of miscalculation, especially in high-contact theaters such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea.

However, given the broader context of military expansion, operational exercises, and technological decoupling, structural competition remains unchanged, and competition with guardrails will become the norm, Hsu added.



Is the US adjusting its policy toward Taiwan?

In a recent interview on the US news program 60 Minutes, Trump was asked whether he would order US forces to defend Taiwan if China launched a military attack. Trump refused to reveal specific response plans, saying, “I can't give away my secrets.”

He stated that Xi Jinping and his officials had openly said in meetings, “we would never do anything while President Trump is president, because they know the consequences.”

Professor Huang said that only after US-China relations are anchored will the United States begin to consider what kind of relationship it wants to maintain with Taiwan.

Huang said that if the power gap between the US and China continues to shrink, and the military balance across the Taiwan Strait tilts further in China’s favor—while dialogue between the two sides remains absent and Xi Jinping continues to insist that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and a core national interest, then Americans may begin to question whether it’s worth completely jeopardizing US–China relations over the Taiwan issue.

Huang noted that recently several articles have emerged to discuss whether the US should support Taiwan or defend Taiwan, and this sentiment can be googled on the internet.

For example, Lyle Goldstein published an article titled “The US must beware of Taiwan’s reckless leader,” concluding that “Taiwan does not represent a vital US national security interest. It is not a treaty ally, nor are the various geostrategic or economic rationales to defend Taiwan enough to risk a potentially catastrophic great power war.”

Yet on the other side, Hsu Yu-jen said that Trump conveyed a deterrent message in the 60 Minutes interview by saying “they know the consequences,” thereby upholding strategic ambiguity by neither committing to details nor ruling out action.



Would US troops in South Korea help Taiwan?

Defense Secretary Hegseth stated on October 4th that the primary mission of US forces stationed in South Korea remains deterring North Korea. Still, he also noted that Washington maintains flexibility in responding to unexpected regional contingencies.

Hegseth’s remarks have been interpreted by some Taiwanese media as suggesting that US forces in South Korea might assist in defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion should conflict break out in the Taiwan Strait.

Hsu Yu-jen said that Hegseth’s comments can reasonably be interpreted as indicating available support options, but not an expansion of US security commitments to Taiwan.

Hsu said that Hegseth clearly stated that the foremost mission of US forces in South Korea remains deterring North Korea, while they retain flexibility in dealing with regional contingencies.

Whether such forces would be used still depends on presidential decisions, congressional politics, South Korea’s stance, and allied coordination, Hsu added.

Professor Huang noted that US forces, wherever they are stationed, are still US forces, and how the US chooses to employ them is ultimately its decision. It is very difficult for a host country to exert significant influence or to compel US forces not to relocate or be used in other areas, Huang added

Professor Huang continued, “Overall, the Korean Peninsula has its own troubles and dangers; South Korea generally does not wish for US forces in South Korea to become involved in Taiwan Strait affairs: one reason is to guard against North Korean provocations, and the other is to avoid antagonizing mainland China.”

How should Taiwan prepare?

TCN asked the interviewed experts how they would advise the Taiwanese government to respond to the evolving US-China relationship and the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

Professor Huang noted that he believes the United States and China are still exploring how to coexist with one another, and there is still a long way to go.

Professor Huang offered a past example to illustrate the many uncertainties that remain in US-China relations: in November 2017, after the Chinese Communist Party concluded its 19th National Congress, President Trump made a formal state visit to China.

Yet only one month later, in December, the US National Security Strategy was released, categorizing China and Russia as “revisionist powers,” and four months after that, the US-China trade war broke out, Huang added

Professor Huang noted that under such circumstances, Taiwan should focus on strengthening its economic capabilities, ensuring a stable electricity supply, and avoiding energy shortages. He emphasized that rather than concentrating solely on partisan rivalry, Taiwan must devote more time to thinking strategically about US-China competition.

Taiwan should prepare on several fronts

For self-defense and resilience, Hsu said Taiwan should accelerate the stockpiling of critical munitions and spare parts, and establish dispersed storage sites and dual-use military-civilian supply points to withstand prolonged attrition. For infrastructure, Hsu noted that Taiwan should ensure multi-path backup systems for electricity and communications, strengthen cybersecurity and protection against psychological warfare, and develop rapid repair capabilities for ports and airports.

Regarding energy and medical supplies, Hsu noted that Taiwan should maintain a mobilization reserve of 60 to 90 days to ensure continuity of essential services and government operations during a crisis.

Hsu also argued that Taiwan should focus on regional cooperation and building multilateral support. He suggested Taiwan pragmatically align with the US military’s flexible support framework and present its international messaging as the lowest-risk option for shared interests, supply chain security, and regional stability. This approach, he said, would position Taiwan as a critical node and risk buffer for US-Japan-Korea and Indo-Pacific economic security, rather than depending solely on value-based appeals.

After the Trump-Xi meeting, both the United States and China appear to be seeking to reduce the risk of conflict. As the experts cited above have noted, Washington and Beijing are looking for ways to manage their relationship, and Taiwan may need to draw on professional expertise to find wiser approaches in responding to these developments.