President Lai’s New Year Address focuses on defense, not Cross-Strait definition

President Lai Ching-te’s 2026 New Year’s Address highlighted domestic challenges and the need for stronger defense, while notably avoiding a clear definition of Taiwan’s stance toward China.

This year’s address, titled “Bolstering National Strength through Democracy to Enter a New Global Landscape,” was delivered by President Lai on Jan. 1 in the Reception Hall of the Presidential Office.

Unlike in previous years, President Lai did not clearly state Taiwan’s position in relation to mainland China in this important speech, although he did mention the Taiwan Strait.

In his speech, President Lai said, “Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are essential components of global security and prosperity. Taiwan needs to prepare for danger in times of peace.”

He stated that Taiwan must continue to increase its national defense budget, strengthen its defense capabilities, and demonstrate its determination to protect the country.

Focus on national challenges

Dr. Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a professor in the Department of Political Science at National Cheng Kung University, told TCN that President Lai’s New Year’s address this year mainly focused on domestic affairs, outlining the challenges and problems Taiwan is facing as a nation.

Dr. Wang said the logic of President Lai’s speech was that although these challenges largely come from within Taiwan, they are closely tied to changes in the external environment.

According to Dr. Wang, Lai argued that as China’s expansionist ambitions grow, Taiwan needs to increase its defense budget. However, the defense budget is currently stalled in the Legislative Yuan, which creates serious difficulties for Taiwan in defending its sovereignty.

Dr. Wang also noted that Lai may have hoped to help the public understand that the difficulties his administration faces are not solely of his own making.

In addition, Dr. Wang said that President Lai’s remarks underscored that the Chinese military threat is now extremely difficult to resolve, which is why Lai did not go deeper into defining cross-strait political relations and instead chose to focus on what he views as the most important issues.

The disappearance of the “Republic of China”

Professor Ho Chih-yung (何志勇), a political scientist at the Center of General Education at National Tsing Hua University, told TCN that the biggest difference in this year’s New Year’s Day address compared with previous years is that President Lai did not mention the “Republic of China” (Taiwan’s official name) even once.

Professor Ho noted that the reason Taiwan has a public holiday on Jan. 1 is that it is the Founding Day of the Republic of China (ROC).

He went on to say that completely omitting any mention of the ROC, and also not mentioning the People’s Republic of China, on such an important national anniversary reflects a return to the core ideological position of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

He suggested that some may hope to use the threat of war or external pressure to improve their chances of re-election. “But we do not want a wartime president,” Ho added.

Taiwan under US–China relations in 2026

Dr. Wang said that leaders of the United States and China may meet at least four times this year, and the Taiwan issue will likely be raised in some of those meetings.

Whenever Taiwan is discussed, Wang said, it will have an impact on cross-strait relations.

The key question, Dr. Wang said, is how Taiwan will be discussed and whether the United States or China will try to influence each other’s Taiwan policy.

He explained that if the outcome is negative for Taiwan, it would suggest that Xi Jinping is pushing the United States to make concessions.

If the outcome is positive for Taiwan, it would indicate that President Trump is holding the line and maintaining long-standing US policy toward Taiwan, Wang added.

Professor Ho noted that President Lai’s New Year’s address did not mention the role of the United States, particularly its position on the Taiwan Strait.

Ho believes US–China relations are currently warming.

He explained that the large-scale live-fire military exercises China carried out around Taiwan at the end of 2025, and the way US President Trump responded, suggest that Washington and Beijing may now share a tacit understanding not to escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

This also reaffirms the US “one-China” policy framework, Ho said, and US–China relations may be expected to continue improving rather than deteriorating.

From Dec. 29 to 31, 2025, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) carried out a large-scale joint military exercise under the codename “Justice Mission-2025” in the air and sea areas surrounding Taiwan, simulating blockade and encirclement operations and conducting live-fire drills.

Cross-Strait Relations in 2026

Regarding how cross-strait relations may develop in 2026, Dr. Wang said the first thing to watch is whether the new chairperson of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) will be able to play an effective role.

The SEF is a semi-official organization in Taiwan responsible for handling negotiations and contacts with mainland China in the absence of formal official relations.

If not, Wang said, cross-strait interaction will likely take place directly between the Mainland Affairs Council on the Taiwan side and the Taiwan Affairs Office on the mainland Chinese side, at the official level.

In Nov. 2025, Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng (邱垂正) said in a Radio Taiwan International (RTI) interview that the real crux of cross-strait relations lies in Beijing’s continued refusal to recognize the objective existence of the ROC, as well as the Taiwanese people’s commitment to a free and democratic way of life. 

Dr. Wang believes Beijing is unlikely to recognize the objective existence of the ROC, since it continues to insist that the DPP acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, and as a result the stalemate is likely to continue because China will not respond.

The 1992 Consensus refers to an understanding reached between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in 1992 that both sides acknowledge there is only one China, but each side is free to interpret what “China” means. The “China” recognized by Taipei is the ROC.

It was recently reported that Taiwan’s Kuomintang Chairperson Cheng Li-wen (鄭麗文) has expressed a willingness to visit China in the first half of 2026, according to CNA.

Dr. Wang said that after the 2025 Taipei–Shanghai Twin-City Forum concluded, China immediately launched military exercises, and based on Beijing’s current approach of using military drills to pressure Lai Ching-te rather than fostering dialogue between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, he believes Cheng Li-wen’s planned visit to China will have a much smaller impact.

Dr. Wang also said that the large-scale military drills conducted by the People’s Liberation Army at the end of 2025 exceeded expectations, suggesting that similar exercises targeting Taiwan may increase in both frequency and intensity in 2026.