Taiwan on the map (shutterstock)

A Venezuela-style strike is not comparable to Taiwan, experts say

While the surprise US operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has prompted questions regarding whether China might adopt a similar approach toward Taiwan, Taiwanese experts argue that the two situations are fundamentally incomparable.

On January 3, US President Donald Trump announced that the US forces had successfully captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife during an overnight joint military mission labeled as Operation Absolute Resolve.

The capture sparked widespread discussion on Chinese social media, with The New York Times reporting that some voices on Chinese platforms questioned why Beijing could not take similar action against Taiwan and arrest its president.

China sees self-ruled Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) as an inseparable part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to unify it.

In an interview with The New York Times, President Trump was asked if the Venezuela incident established a precedent that could justify a Chinese move against Taiwan. 

Trump responded that while Xi Jinping views Taiwan as a separatist threat, the Chinese leader’s actions are ultimately his own to decide. Trump added, however, that should Xi take such a step, he would express his unhappiness directly to him, though he noted his belief that Xi would not make such a decision.

A Venezuela-style strike on Taiwan?

Dr. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang (黃介正), Professor at the Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, told TCN that Beijing and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would closely study the US operation to capture Maduro.

Dr. Hu Jui-cho (胡瑞舟), a retired major general of the Republic of China (ROC) Army and deputy director of the Taiwan Center for Security Studies at National Chengchi University (NCCU), told TCN that mainland China would closely assess the supporting measures adopted by the United States in this operation, including intelligence preparation, military readiness, methods for weakening internal resistance, and international reactions, and analyze them as references for how it might handle related international affairs in the future.

Dr. Hu believed, however, that Chinese leaders are unlikely to carry out a similar operation to capture Taiwan’s leadership.

Hu said that even if Taiwan’s leaders were taken into custody, it would be highly improbable to achieve a regime transfer or a total reversal of the cross-strait situation without first dismantling Taiwan’s military capabilities and domestic resistance.

In terms of military capability, Dr. Huang noted that the PLA currently lacks the integrated capabilities and operational depth required to execute a comparable operation at scale.

Dr. Huang also emphasized that Taiwan’s military professionalism, institutional resilience, and societal cohesion make a Venezuela-style operation by Beijing highly improbable, and that removing a single political figure would not disrupt the continuity of Taiwan’s government.

Taiwan's preparation

In fact, Taiwan has long prepared for the possibility of a decapitation-style strike.

According to Taiwan's China Times, Taiwan’s military has long trained to prevent a PLA decapitation strike against its leaders under a plan known as the “Wan Jun Plan,” led by the Military Police with support from Marine special forces, while national security agencies closely monitor potential Chinese actions and assess threats on a day-to-day basis rather than relying on past incidents.


A ROC Armed Forces unit takes part in an exercise. (MNA)
A ROC Armed Forces unit takes part in an exercise. (MNA)

Beijing seizing the opportunity

The US actions in Venezuela, Dr. Hu said, can be seen as a return to international realism—a world where the strong do as they please while the weak are forced to accept their fate.

This situation could undermine the rules-based international order and erode global confidence in the effectiveness of established norms and international law, Hu added.

Dr. Hu went on to say that while the US demonstrated formidable hard power in this operation, it may have simultaneously damaged the soft power it has cultivated since the Cold War, specifically regarding universal values such as human rights and democracy, and that China may seize on the Venezuela incident in its diplomatic messaging to further weaken US soft power and its global image.

On January 5, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian (林劍) stated at a press briefing that China condemns the US action against Venezuela. Lin characterized the operation as a serious violation of international law and the basic norms governing international relations, arguing that it infringes upon Venezuela’s sovereignty and threatens peace and security across Latin America and the Caribbean.

Turning to the situation in the Taiwan Strait, Hu stated that rather than launching a Venezuela-style strike, Beijing may focus on leveraging this incident to gain greater international support and legitimacy. 

By doing so, China aims to preemptively blunt the impact of international criticism should it ever use force against Taiwan and face accusations of violating international law, Hu noted.

No effect on Trump–Xi summit

Professor Huang said that the US operation in Venezuela reflects Washington’s renewed emphasis on homeland security and the Western Hemisphere under Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

He noted that continued US dominance in the Western Hemisphere complicates China’s Latin America strategy and will force Beijing to reassess its regional calculations. 

However, with regard to US–China relations, Huang said, it is unlikely to derail broader efforts by Washington and Beijing to manage strategic competition or prevent the expected summits between Trump and Xi.

Dr. Hu echoed this sentiment, noting that mainland China is navigating its own domestic challenges, including economic stagnation and pressure from US-imposed technology restrictions and tariffs.

Consequently, Beijing will continue to seek ways to bypass these constraints and maintain a functional relationship with Washington, therefore, the Venezuela incident is unlikely to impact the Trump–Xi summit scheduled for April, Hu added.