Taiwan Current News (TCN), in partnership with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), has launched a new podcast series, Taiwan Frontlines, to track global trends and explore how Taiwan connects with the world.Semiconductors have become essential to modern life, powering everything from smartphones and military equipment to today’s AI boom, and they are now closely tied to national security.To launch the series, Taiwan Frontlines invited renowned scholar Dr. Chris Miller, author of Chip War and a professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, to discuss the most pressing challenges facing the global semiconductor industry and what they mean for Taiwan’s security and the broader international landscape.Silicon shieldThe term “silicon shield,” which refers to the idea that Taiwan’s crucial role in producing advanced semiconductors gives other countries a strong incentive to help protect the island, is often linked to discussions of Taiwan’s security.Dr. Miller argued that Beijing’s desire to control Taiwan long predates the semiconductor era, and that chips are only one part of a much broader strategic calculation.Miller added that when considering stability in the Taiwan Strait, it is important to examine what China imports from Taiwan, as any conflict would be enormously costly to China’s own economy and therefore serves as a key deterrent to aggressive moves by Beijing.Rare earthsRare earths also feature prominently in the interview with Dr. Miller.China currently dominates the global rare earth supply chain, accounting for about 70 percent of mining and more than 85 percent of processing capacity. Beijing can use export controls to create choke points that affect the global semiconductor supply chain, including in the United States, turning supply leverage into a political bargaining tool.Dr. Miller said countries should develop a test for trade with China to identify which areas are truly concerning, focusing on espionage risk, sabotage risk, and dependency risk. He described rare earths as a textbook case of dependency risk.He noted that the United States and its partners have discussed the problem for around 15 years but have taken very little action. In recent months, as China has attempted to use rare earth export controls as political leverage, Miller said this has become a genuine spur to action in Western countries to finally reduce these dependencies.Asked whether the West can significantly cut its reliance on China’s rare earths within 18 to 24 months, a timeline suggested by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Miller said he believes Bessent’s view is more accurate than that of the most pessimistic observers.Still, Miller pointed to key uncertainties, including how quickly new processing capacity can come online, how fast companies can redesign products to use fewer rare earths, and what level of remaining dependence is low enough that China can no longer exert leverage.Split in semiconductor productionRegarding the idea of a 50–50 split in semiconductor production between Taiwan and the United States, mentioned by US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Miller said it is not easy to build large amounts of manufacturing capacity quickly in the United States.Beyond time constraints, he cited workforce shortages and noted that semiconductor fabs are extraordinarily complex and expensive to build.He added that the United States also needs to define what the right number actually is by deciding how much chip production must be located domestically and how much can remain in Taiwan for Washington to feel secure.The United States does not need to make every chip at home, Miller said, and the key question is whether a balance such as 50–50, or even something like 70 percent remaining in Taiwan, would be sufficient to manage worst-case risks.For more in-depth coverage, tune in to Taiwan Frontlines on the NOWNEWS official YouTube channel.