World map (Shutterstock)

While the world order is shifting, middle powers are looking for a way in

As the global order built after World War II begins to fray and great powers assert themselves more aggressively, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s call for middle powers to cooperate raises urgent questions for countries like Taiwan about how to navigate a changing world.

On Jan. 20, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, speaking at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, stated the rules-based international order is receding, and called for middle powers, such as Canada, to work together to respond the rise of hard power and great power rivalry, and to build a new order that can accommodate values including respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of all countries. 

The rules-based international order is basically the system the United States helped build after World War II, with the United Nations at its center, in which countries maintain peace and cooperation through jointly established international organizations, rules, and norms. This system was further strengthened after the Cold War with the emergence of US unipolar dominance.

The United States

Within the rules-based international order, the US has been essential, much as the League of Nations collapsed after World War I without US involvement, and the system the US helped build still depends heavily on its leadership.

However, over the past year, a series of US actions—such as President Trump announcing new tariffs, detaining the president of Venezuela, withdrawing from 66 international organizations, and calling for the annexation of Greenland—appear to move increasingly far away from the rules-based order.

In an opinion piece published in The Guardian, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown wrote that the United States “has abandoned its longstanding championing of the rule of law, human rights, democracy and the territorial integrity of nation states.”

Dr. Robert Kagan, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote in The Atlantic that the Trump administration’s published 2026 National Security Strategy officially declares the end of the US-led liberal world order. Kegan noted that this is not because the US lacks the material capacity to sustain such an order, but because the US itself has chosen no longer to play the historically unprecedented role of providing security for the world. 


US military (Shutterstock)
US military (Shutterstock)

A changing world order

Dr. Huang Chieh-cheng (黃介正), Professor at the Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, told TCN that signs of the world moving away from Pax Americana are becoming increasingly clear.

Professor Huang Kwei-bo (黃奎博) of the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University told TCN that the international order built by the US after World War II is not dead yet, but it has been sent to the intensive care unit. 

He said that not only can superpowers now walk away from international systems or make their own rules, but other countries with enough clout can do the same, leaving international law and shared rules as loose guidelines rather than real limits, weakening global institutions, reviving behind-the-scenes deal-making among major powers, and even reshaping ideas like democracy, human rights, and equality.

Victims

Dr. Huang Chieh-cheng said that the interests of middle powers and small states are best protected when the international system operates under a rules-based international order. If those rules and that order are challenged or overturned, and the world moves toward raw power politics, everyone could end up losing, he added.

Professor Huang Kwei-bo largely agrees, but he believes that major powers such as the United States, Russia, and Mainland China are more likely to benefit, while smaller and developing countries will suffer more. Most of those countries lack strong bargaining power and have far less ability to absorb the shocks and losses that come with such changes, making them more vulnerable, he added.

Yalta 2.0?

As the world seems to be moving back toward a system where major powers call the shots, it may also mean a return to the old practice of dividing the world into spheres of influence.

Angela Stent, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, mentioned that US actions in Venezuela and President Trump's insistence on American dominance in the Western Hemisphere have raised new expectations in the Kremlin, effectively suggesting that other major powers are entitled to similar spheres of influence. She added that the Kremlin hopes this could pave the way for a new “Yalta system,” granting Moscow greater freedom to act in neighboring regions and potentially beyond.

The Yalta system refers to the post-World War II international order established by the 1945 Yalta Conference agreements among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, which effectively divided the world into spheres of influence dominated by the major powers, paving the way for the bipolar structure of the Cold War.

Dr. Huang Chieh-cheng said it is still too early to say whether a new G2 or three-power order will emerge, because power is shifting in real time, countries are adjusting based on their own interests, and the final outcome remains unclear. The gap in interests among the three major powers is substantial, and achieving consensus among them would be difficult in and of itself, he added.

Professor Huang Kwei-bo also believes that the conditions for a new Yalta system are not yet in place. 

He mentioned that although the personal relationships between Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping exist, they have not overridden the deep competition among the three countries in politics, economics, the military, and technology. While high-level bilateral talks between the US and Russia, the US and Mainland China, and Russia and Mainland China may increase in the short term, their long-term impact on the overall relationship among the three powers remains to be seen, Huang Kwei-bo added.


US President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a meeting (Shutterstock)
US President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a meeting (Shutterstock)

New order

Canadian Prime Minister Carney’s call for middle powers to work together offers a possible path forward, but the big question is whether it can actually work.

Professor Huang Chieh-cheng noted that middle powers such as India, Japan, the UK, Canada, and Australia are forming new, flexible security and economic partnerships that do not rely on the United States, as they may be unwilling to accept a world simply dominated by a few great powers.

Professor Huang Kwei-bo pointed out that without US support, multilateral cooperation traditionally based on international law and shared rules is either weakened or must rely on backing from other mid-sized or major countries, though some scholars argue that certain frameworks could continue functioning independently after years of operation. 

He added that smaller countries have little choice but to follow the prevailing trends, while middle powers such as Canada, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, South Korea, and Japan are inclined to collaborate in defending international values and cooperation mechanisms, likely leading to more active middle-power diplomacy in the coming years to safeguard their national interests.

What should Taiwan do?

Professor Huang Kwei-bo indicated that Taiwan can also be regarded as a middle power, albeit one with very limited formal diplomatic recognition and access to only a small number of official international organizations and cooperation frameworks. 

Because of this constrained position, Huang noted, Taiwan should abandon its "all-in-one-side” diplomatic mindset—still shared only by North Korea, Myanmar, the Philippines, and itself in East Asia—and instead prioritize its long-term political, economic, and strategic interests by returning, as US-China relations gradually improve, to a posture of remaining close to the United States while maintaining peaceful relations with mainland China, provided this serves Taiwan’s own interests.

Professor Huang Chieh-cheng expressed similar view, stating that Taiwan should avoid taking sides, cultivate extensive friendships and alliances, seek leverage, and maintain a balanced middle path.