China's Two Sessions signal shift in Taiwan policy from words to action

China held its annual “Two Sessions” meetings from Mar. 4 to Mar. 11, during which Premier Li Qiang (李強) reaffirmed Beijing’s stance on Taiwan in the government work report. Taiwanese officials and experts said China’s Taiwan policy is shifting from political declarations toward concrete policies and actions.

Li said China would “fully implement the Communist Party’s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era,” adhere to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, and resist external interference. He added that Beijing would continue to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and advance the cause of “national reunification.”

The 1992 Consensus refers to a tacit understanding reached between representatives of Taiwan and China in 1992 that both sides acknowledge there is “one China,” while allowing different interpretations of what “China” means.

On Mar. 6, Song Tao (宋濤), director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, made similar remarks during an exchange with the National People’s Congress Taiwan delegation. Song reiterated the importance of adhering to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, cracking down on “Taiwan independence” forces, opposing foreign interference, and maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan officials respond

Speaking at a forum hosted by Tamkang University’s Center for Cross-Strait Relations on Mar. 10, Shen Yu-chung (沈有忠), deputy minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), said Beijing’s efforts to promote unification with Taiwan, counter independence movements, and conduct cross-border repression are expected to expand this year. 

Shen said China’s Taiwan policy is advancing in 2026 along what he described as a “two promotion, two opposition” framework: promoting unification, promoting integration, opposing independence, and opposing foreign intervention. While these principles had previously been largely declaratory, Shen said they are now being translated into concrete policies and actions.

Shen said China’s insistence on the “1992 Consensus” amounts to a claim to eliminate the Republic of China (official name for Taiwan), and that no political party or individual should cooperate with what he described as Beijing’s agenda.

Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress

During the Two Sessions, Chinese authorities also submitted a draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress for review by the National People’s Congress. The legislation would elevate the concept of building a “shared consciousness of the Chinese nation” into a legal obligation and explicitly calls for uniting forces from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese communities.

The bill also establishes legal liability for actions deemed to undermine ethnic unity.

Shen warned that the legislation could be used to punish Chinese citizens who do not promote national unity. 

He argued that because Beijing claims Taiwan falls under Chinese legal jurisdiction, authorities could cite legal grounds to target Taiwanese who do not support national unity, describing the law as a form of transnational repression and extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Taiwan must not overlook

At the same forum, Chang Wu-ueh (張五岳), director of Tamkang University’s Center for Cross-Strait Relations, said the most significant outcome of this year’s Two Sessions was the advancement of China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan.

Chang noted that although five-year plans have always been important, Beijing has rarely referenced them so frequently. He said Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, have repeatedly highlighted the opportunities the plan could bring to other countries when meeting foreign leaders following the Communist Party’s Fourth Plenum, which he said was relatively uncommon in the past.

He said Beijing will likely conduct deeper evaluations of its Taiwan policy, including areas where it can act unilaterally — such as restricting Taiwan’s diplomatic space, influencing its participation in international forums, or experimenting with integration policies in Fujian province — as well as areas that require cross-strait interaction or influence within Taiwan itself.

Chang also noted that Taiwanese society should not underestimate sections of the upcoming plan dedicated to Taiwan, particularly those related to promoting cross-strait integration and advancing unification. 

He said Beijing may leverage its international influence and domestic policy experimentation in Fujian. While either peaceful or military unification may not be achieved within the next five years, he said China is also unlikely to limit its actions to rhetorical statements alone.

At the same event, Dr. Tang Kai-tai (唐開太), an advisory committee member at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations, said China’s Taiwan policy may become both “harder and softer” simultaneously.

He cautioned that several indicators should be closely watched in the short to medium term, including whether China continues to lure away Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, whether the frequency of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan increases or decreases, and how Beijing may attempt to influence Taiwan during its election year through various united-front strategies.

Military activity near Taiwan

According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), between Feb. 28 and Mar. 10, Chinese military aircraft activity near Taiwan was relatively limited. Apart from two Chinese support aircraft shortly entering Taiwan’s southwestern air defense identification zone on Mar. 7, no other PLA aircraft were detected operating around Taiwan during that period.

China regards self-ruled Taiwan as a breakaway province that must eventually come under Beijing’s control and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve what it calls “unification.”

In 2021, Admiral Phil Davidson, then commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that China could develop the military capability to threaten or control Taiwan within six years.

Dr. Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), told TCN that Beijing has never officially stated that it plans to resolve the Taiwan issue, invade Taiwan, or “liberate” Taiwan by 2027. 

He noted that the year became widely discussed largely after Davidson suggested it as a possible timeframe for a Chinese attack.

Following the 2022 visit to Taiwan by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted seven large-scale encirclement drills around Taiwan through the end of 2025. During the most recent exercise in late December 2025, some designated drill zones extended into areas within Taiwan’s territorial waters.

Hung Yao-nan (洪耀南), a professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University, told TCN that the PLA is currently facing vacancies among senior generals, and that many senior officers are focused on the upcoming 21st Party Congress in 2027.

Hung said Chinese military leaders are therefore likely to adopt a more cautious posture this year, prioritizing safety and stability to ensure smooth leadership transitions.

He added that the commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command is currently ranked among the top four full generals and could enter the Central Military Commission next year if no unexpected developments occur, making stability a key priority. As a result, Beijing may not feel the need to apply maximum military pressure at this stage.

However, Hung mentioned that the Chinese coast guard could increase both the frequency and intensity of its operations. He added that raising the intensity of large-scale joint military operations would be more difficult, making maritime pressure more prominent.