China's Two Sessions end, but questions linger over PLA's chain of command

China’s annual “Two Sessions” political meetings concluded this week with continued signs of a sweeping purge within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a shake-up that could reshape the military’s leadership while reducing the likelihood of a major conflict in the near term.

China convened its annual concurrent gatherings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in Beijing from March 4 to 11. At the NPC, 2,765 of an expected 2,878 delegates attended, leaving 113 absent — the highest number of absences outside the COVID-19 period.

Among those absent were three senior national-level officials, including Politburo member Ma Xingrui (馬興瑞), who has not appeared in public since the Chinese Communist Party’s National Day celebrations last year.

According to the NPC, the latest list of representatives from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police includes 243 delegates. Two senior military figures who reportedly came under scrutiny in January — former Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman Zhang Youxia (張又俠) and former chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli (劉振立) — remain on the list.

Military purge 

Kou Chien-wen (寇健文), a distinguished professor in the Department of Political Science at National Chengchi University, said in a radio interview that Zhang and Liu likely remain NPC delegates because investigations into them have not yet concluded, noting that the controversy surrounding them emerged less than two months ago.

Kou also pointed out that 19 individuals were removed from their positions as NPC delegates during this year’s sessions. 

Kou mentioned that nine of them were active-duty or retired military officers, including five generals, one lieutenant general and three major general. Among the five generals, three had served alongside former CMC Political Work Department Director Miao Hua (苗華) at different times.

Miao, a former PLA Navy admiral, CMC member and director of the Political Work Department, was suspended from duty in December 2024 on suspicion of serious disciplinary violations. He was removed as an NPC delegate in April 2025, stripped of his CMC membership in June that year and expelled from the Communist Party in October.

Kou added that the purge has also affected the military’s presence in the CPPCC. Among the CPPCC members whose qualifications were revoked or retroactively invalidated this time, three were PLA generals, two of whom had also worked with Miao. 

In addition, 11 civilian officials lost their CPPCC membership, with seven to eight of them linked to the military system, Kou said.

According to Kou, the ongoing military purge appears to follow two main lines: one linked to Miao and networks tied to the former Nanjing Military Region — now the Eastern Theater Command, which is primarily responsible for operations related to Taiwan — and another involving the equipment development system, including weapons research and the broader defense industrial chain.

Xi’s authority remains secure

Hung Yao-nan (洪耀南), a professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University, responded to TCN's question during a forum hosted by the university’s Center for Cross-Strait Relations by saying that personnel reshuffles among provincial party secretaries and other key local leaders over the next year will gradually shape the leadership lineup for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 21st National Congress.

Hung said that at least three to four members of the Politburo Standing Committee are likely to be replaced. While various factions may compete for influence, he said these struggles are largely limited to smaller factional rivalries.

“There is no anti-Xi faction,” Hung said, “opposition to Xi simply does not exist.”

Hung also noted that Xi Jinping (習近平) does not need to launch a military attack on Taiwan to secure another term in power. “His reappointment is almost guaranteed, and he does not need a war over Taiwan as a political achievement,” he said.

Instead, Xi’s broader strategy is focused on achieving “socialist modernization” by 2035, Hung said, suggesting that Xi’s tenure could extend further into the future.

Military purge creates leadership gap

Chang Wu-ueh (張五岳), director of Tamkang University’s Center for Cross-Strait Relations, said at a forum organized by the Institute for National Policy Research (INPR) that the military purge has created a leadership vacuum within the PLA.

Chang said that of the seven members of the CMC, only Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin (張升民) remain in place, while all other members have been purged. Among the PLA’s estimated 35 to 40 full generals, he added, only about four are currently active in normal duties.

Chang said the military’s internal investigation and restructuring are still underway and could reach an initial conclusion at the CCP’s 20th Central Committee Fifth Plenum this autumn. The vacancies may not all be filled immediately, but the situation is likely to become clearer as the party prepares for the 21st Party Congress next year, Chang added.

Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), expressed a similar view. 

Responding to questions during a forum, Shen told TCN that Chinese leaders must determine how to fill the numerous vacant general positions and clarify future military policy and force development plans before 2027.

Short-term risk of major war seen as low

Kou said the recent purge of senior PLA leadership could accelerate generational turnover within the military while also creating a climate of fear among officers. Such an atmosphere may affect not only the military but also the broader civilian bureaucracy.

He added that the likelihood of the PLA launching a large-scale war in the near term appears relatively low. While military exercises and external pressure — including drills targeting Taiwan — are expected to continue, a major conflict would likely require the military to first rebuild its operational structure and command system.

China views self-ruled Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, as a breakaway province and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve unification.

Military modernization goals remain a priority

During the Two Sessions, Chinese Premier Li Qiang (李強) stated in the government work report that Beijing will fully implement the system of responsibility under the chairman of the CMC, strengthen political control over the armed forces and continue deepening political discipline within the military. He described current efforts as a “critical battle” to achieve the goal of building a modernized military by the PLA’s centenary in 2027.

Shen said China must at least develop sufficient military capability to deter the United States and Japan from intervening in a potential Taiwan Strait conflict. 

However, with just over a year remaining before the 2027 target, Beijing is aware that the objective may be difficult to fully achieve, Shen said, which is why officials describe the current phase as a “critical battle.”