Trump postpones Xi meeting as Taiwan experts flag hidden risks

The anticipated summit between the United States and China in late March and early April is expected to be postponed, prompting Taiwanese experts to warn that Taipei should respond with caution amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.

Speaking at the White House on March 16, US President Donald Trump said Washington is requesting that Beijing to postpone the Trump-Xi meeting by about a month due to the ongoing US conflict with Iran, which requires Trump’s attention in Washington.

The Strait of Hormuz is the key

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a political science professor at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, told TCN that stability in the Strait of Hormuz could become a key variable affecting the timing of the Trump–Xi meeting.

Wang said the US appears to be facing greater-than-expected challenges in stabilizing the situation in Iran. From a strategic standpoint, Middle East issues remain Washington’s top priority, while China-related matters may temporarily take a back seat, Wang added.

Wang noted that a delay could benefit China because, from Beijing’s perspective, the summit was originally scheduled too soon after China’s annual “Two Sessions,” with little clarity from Washington on the agenda. 

Still, Wang thought the summit is unlikely to be postponed indefinitely. “Both sides want to hold talks,” he said, adding that Trump is likely seeking a swift resolution to the Iran situation. 

The key factor, Wang said, is whether the US can restore and maintain at least a significant degree of stability in the Strait of Hormuz.

Not necessarily good news

Hung Yao-nan (洪耀南), a professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University, cautioned that a delay may not necessarily be good news for Taiwan.

Hung said postponement does not mean risks have diminished, but rather that conditions for negotiation are not yet mature. 

Hung noted that in the interim, both Washington and Beijing may escalate public actions to build leverage, such as advancing Section 301 investigations, tightening technology restrictions, and increasing military signaling before seeking higher-level agreements.

“In many cases, a delay does not signal de-escalation, but rather an intensification of bargaining,” Hung added.

Implications for Taiwan

Wang emphasized that Beijing does not expect a single leaders’ summit to resolve all bilateral issues, given the structural nature of US–China tensions. However, he noted the first high-level meeting between US and Chinese leaders in 2026 will be crucial in setting the framework for future negotiations.

According to Wang, China’s primary concern is not tariffs or trade disputes per se, but how such issues can be leveraged to secure US policy concessions. 

For example, Wang noted Beijing is wary of Japan moving toward greater “strategic clarity” on Taiwan and may seek to pressure Washington to rein in Tokyo’s position and return it to a more ambiguous stance.

Wang also suggested that China may attempt to shape narratives around Taiwan by attributing its own positions — such as “peaceful reunification” — to statements by Trump, even if they do not reflect actual changes in US policy. 

Additionally, Wang said Beijing may use large-scale purchase agreements as bargaining tools to extract tangible concessions from the US, potentially targeting areas such as US arms sales to Taiwan, transit arrangements for Taiwanese leaders, or the institutionalization of US–Taiwan relations, including high-level visits.

Hung believed that Taiwan-related issues in the summit could undergo shifts “beyond prior expectations.” 

One possibility is that Taiwan moves from being a central topic to a “background bargaining chip,” Hung said.

Hung explained Washington could privately emphasize crisis management, non-provocation, and maintaining the status quo in exchange for Chinese cooperation on trade, rare earths, or Middle East-related issues.

Another potential shift is the growing prominence of Taiwan’s role in global technology and supply chains, Hung noted. He mentioned that that disputes over critical minerals, export controls, and manufacturing security are central to US–China competition, meaning Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and high-tech supply chain position will likely be more deeply embedded in summit discussions.

How Taiwan should respond

Wang identified US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as a potentially key figure in the expected summit discussion involving Taiwan, noting that Beijing is unlikely to block his participation despite sanctions China imposed on him in 2020 over his actions as a US senator. China’s Foreign Ministry said on March 16 that those sanctions targeted Rubio’s China-related actions during his Senate years, suggesting they would not necessarily affect a visit alongside Trump.

Wang added that while Trump may lack deep understanding of Taiwan-related issues, Rubio has long recognized their significance.

Hung outlined several steps Taiwan should take in response, saying Taipei should upgrade its engagement with the US from political signaling to regulatory and supply chain integration, while also framing “non-China supply chains” as institutional capabilities rather than mere slogans.

He added that Taiwan should strengthen its resilience in energy supply and price stability, and avoid passively waiting for US–China negotiations by adopting a framework of continuous monitoring across multiple fronts.

Section 301 Investigations

Recent developments in trade policy are adding further complexity.

According to an Associated Press report, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰) held a new round of economic and trade talks in Paris on March 15, seen as paving the way for the upcoming summit.

Prior to the talks, the US launched a new round of Section 301 investigations on March 12 targeting 16 major trading partners, including China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam — and Taiwan.

Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency reported that He raised concerns about the investigations during the Paris talks, reiterating Beijing’s opposition to unilateral US tariffs and urging Washington to remove such measures.

Wang said the move signals that the US intends to continue imposing tariffs despite recent legal challenges, including a Supreme Court ruling that undermined much of Trump’s earlier tariff program. He added that tariffs remain a central tool in Trump’s approach to international economic policy.

Hung argued that the new investigations, together with Trump’s decision to link the summit’s timing to developments in the Strait of Hormuz, indicate that negotiations are no longer limited to trade, but instead involve a broader linkage of economic, security, and energy issues.

Taiwan, Hung cautioned, could be directly affected. Although the investigations are still in the preliminary stage and do not yet constitute sanctions, Taiwan’s inclusion suggests it is not exempt from Washington’s latest round of industrial and supply chain scrutiny, he added.

Hung noted that industries in Taiwan that could face higher risks include steel, petrochemicals, machinery, flat-panel displays, certain electronic components, and sectors heavily integrated with Chinese supply chains or lacking clear traceability of raw materials.