Taiwan experts see no immediate threat amid US military redeployment

Taiwanese security analysts say a US decision to redeploy military assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East is unlikely to destabilize the Taiwan Strait in the near term, even as the conflict with Iran continues to reshape Washington's regional posture.

A March 9 report by The Washington Post, citing two US officials, said the Pentagon is redeploying elements of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system from South Korea to the Middle East. 

On March 13, The Wall Street Journal reported that additional US Marines and naval vessels — including two ships from the Japan-based USS Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit — are also being sent to the region.

Taiwan Strait stability

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a professor of political science at National Cheng Kung University, told TCN that the redeployment is unlikely to disrupt overall stability in the Taiwan Strait in the near term. 

While some observers have questioned whether the move could weaken the US military presence in Asia, Wang said the situation has not reached a level that would alter the regional security balance.

Hu Jui-cho (胡瑞舟), a retired major general of the Republic of China (ROC) Army and deputy director of the Taiwan Center for Security Studies at National Chengchi University (NCCU), echoed this assessment. 

Hu told TCN that Beijing is unlikely to take aggressive military action against Taiwan in the near future, citing the upcoming summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). 

He noted that China is unlikely to jeopardize negotiations by escalating military tensions, and instead seeks favorable outcomes on trade, tariffs, and Taiwan policy.

Wang similarly said Beijing is likely prioritizing high-level negotiations with Washington.

Oil prices and strategic competition

Iran’s March 2 announcement of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global energy supplies, with Brent crude prices surpassing $110 per barrel by March 19.

According to the Associated Press, Trump said on March 15 that he had asked seven countries to deploy naval vessels to help keep the strait open. 

International responses have fallen short of expectations, with some countries declining to join the coalition Trump proposed to protect shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz.

“Some are very enthusiastic about it, and some aren’t,” Trump said on March 16, expressing frustration with certain European leaders for what he described as a lack of appreciation for long-term US protection efforts. 

The following day, during a meeting at the White House with Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, Trump again criticized NATO members for refusing to assist, calling it a “foolish mistake.”

Hung Yao-nan (洪耀南), a professor of diplomacy and international relations at Tamkang University, told TCN that the continued US-Iran conflict introduces new variables into US-China strategic competition. 

In the short to medium term, he said, rising energy prices and inflationary pressures are key concerns.

Hung added that the Trump administration appears to be temporarily reframing China from a trade rival into a geopolitical partner under pressure. 

Hung explained that while China has a strong interest in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open due to its reliance on Middle Eastern energy, it is unlikely to join a US-led military escort framework. 

Instead, Beijing may opt for diplomatic mediation, energy coordination, and limited influence over Iran to avoid direct involvement, Hung said.

“This puts US-China relations in a delicate position — non-cooperative on security, yet unable to fully decouple economically,” Hung said.

Longer-term risks for Taiwan

Although large-scale military escalation is unlikely, Hu said China may still engage in limited “probing actions” to assess US response capabilities in the first island chain following the redeployment of forces to the Middle East.

Hu also mentioned that over the longer term, the Iran conflict could influence US strategic calculations regarding Taiwan. 

Hu noted that the current Iran conflict highlights the strain on US forces operating across multiple theaters, even against a mid-level military power, requiring significant reinforcements and resource mobilization. 

Hu said this could lead Washington to reassess the risks of intervention in potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or the Korean Peninsula, and may prompt a broader review of US force posture in East Asia.

Hung expressed a similar view, noting that while tensions in the Taiwan Strait may not escalate immediately, the overall risk structure could deteriorate. 

He said US strategic attention is being diverted to the Middle East, while energy and inflation pressures may push Washington toward a “risk-first, response-later” approach.

In this context, China is likely to observe US capacity and political will to manage simultaneous crises. 

Rather than immediate escalation, Hung said Beijing may increase “gray-zone” pressure, normalize military exercises and law enforcement-style operations, and intensify negotiation pressure on Taiwan — a strategy he described as “testing while watching.”

PLA military aircraft activity near Taiwan

According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, (MND) between Feb. 27 and March 14, only two Chinese military aircraft were briefly detected in the southwestern airspace near Taiwan, with minimal activity observed on Taiwan’s air defense radar systems.

Chinese military activity resumed on March 15, when Taiwan reported 26 aircraft sorties and seven naval vessels operating around the island.

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told TCN that the temporary lull may be attributable to multiple factors. 

He said these include domestic political considerations during China’s “Two Sessions,” efforts to reduce tensions amid Taiwan’s ongoing defense budget discussions, internal military discipline campaigns — possibly targeting the air force — and a deliberate attempt to lower regional tensions ahead of the anticipated Trump-Xi meeting.

Hu offered a similar assessment but emphasized internal military adjustments as the most likely explanation. 

Hu explained that while naval activity did not decrease, the absence of drones and reduced air force operations point toward internal reviews, equipment maintenance, or personnel restructuring within the Chinese military.

Lessons for Taiwan from the Iran conflict

Hu said the Iran conflict offers important lessons for Taiwan.

He noted that modern warfare has demonstrated how quickly radar and air defense systems can be destroyed, and that once detection capabilities are lost, defending against missiles, rockets, and drones becomes extremely difficult.

He stated that existing systems such as Patriot missiles may have limited effectiveness against China’s newer missiles and long-range rockets, while drone threats continue to grow.

Hu also mentioned that air and naval superiority could be lost early in a conflict, making it difficult to sustain combat capabilities over time. In addition, modern warfare increasingly targets critical infrastructure such as electricity and water supplies, he added.

“Taiwan must not only strengthen its military defenses but also enhance societal resilience and infrastructure protection,” Hu said.