Taiwan’s future hinges on politics, not timelines

Taiwan Current News (TCN), in partnership with the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, has launched a new podcast series in 2026, Taiwan Frontlines, to track global trends and explore how Taiwan connects to the world.

In the latest episode, former US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke with Bonnie Glaser and Jason Hsu about intelligence assessments that Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) has instructed the military to be capable of taking Taiwan by force by 2027.

Sullivan offered a measured but critical assessment that the risk of conflict is real — but far from predetermined. Crucially, Sullivan emphasized a key distinction: capability does not equal intent.

Capability vs. intent

While acknowledging China’s rapid military buildup, Sullivan underscored that there is no definitive evidence that Beijing has made a decision to use force.

The 2027 timeline, he suggested, should not be interpreted as a countdown to war, but rather as a benchmark for military readiness — one that reflects long-term strategic planning rather than immediate action.

Sullivan cautioned against interpreting this as a fixed deadline for invasion.

“I don’t know — we have to stay humble,” he said when asked whether Xi will ultimately choose to use force, offering a rare admission of uncertainty even at the highest levels of US intelligence assessment.

Instead, Sullivan described China’s current approach as a multi-pronged pressure strategy — one that seeks to reshape the status quo without resorting to full-scale invasion. According to his analysis, Beijing appears to believe this strategy is already yielding results.

While acknowledging that the risk of conflict exists, Sullivan stated that it is “not especially high in the near term,” and that there is no clear indication Xi is planning an invasion in the immediate future.

Xi’s Taiwan calculus

Sullivan pointed to the likelihood that Xi will remain a dominant figure in Chinese leadership for years to come, shaping decisions at the highest level. He noted that it is entirely possible Xi could view military readiness by that year as a necessary foundation — particularly if tied to long-term political ambitions.

Based on his assessment, Sullivan said that Xi is “not absolutely determined one way or another he's going to have unification before he goes.”

Rather than insisting on a fixed deadline for unification, Sullivan said his basic judgment is that Xi’s priority is ensuring that cross-strait relations are moving in the “right direction.” In practical terms, Sullivan argued that means maintaining a trajectory toward eventual unification — and preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence.

Taiwan’s 2028 election

If 2027 is not a hard deadline, what could actually trigger a crisis? Sullivan pointed to a specific and underappreciated factor: Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election.

He suggested that Beijing is closely watching political developments in Taiwan, particularly for signals that could be interpreted as moves toward formal independence. The outcome of Taiwan’s next election, Sullivan indicated, could become a critical signal shaping Xi’s decision-making, potentially influencing whether Beijing escalates or exercises restraint.

“If the KMT were to come back to power, then I think things might calm down for a time,” Sullivan said. However, he also suggested that “that won't resolve anything over the long run.”

For more in-depth coverage, listen to Taiwan Frontlines on NOWNEWS official YouTube channel.