Interview: Taiwan’s Coast Guard at the front line of democracy, says Deputy Director-General Hsieh Ching-chin

Facing China’s escalating gray-zone activities, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is no longer confined to traditional roles such as maritime law enforcement and search and rescue, and has increasingly moved to the very front line of Taiwan’s national security defense.

In an exclusive interview with TCN, Deputy Director-General of the CGA Hsieh Ching-chin (謝慶欽) said Taiwan now stands on the front line of the global contest between democratic nations and authoritarian regimes — and the Coast Guard is “the very front line of that front line.”

Role transformed

Hsieh noted that the CGA faces a wide range of challenges, including Chinese coast guard vessels, fishing boats operating beyond permitted boundaries, maritime militia, research vessels, and flags-of-convenience ships with Chinese backing. At the same time, CGA must safeguard sovereignty, maritime order, and national security around the clock — without escalating tensions.

He explained that while the CGA was originally established as a maritime law enforcement and rescue agency under legal mandate, Beijing’s growing gray-zone pressure in recent years has transformed its mission. It now simultaneously undertakes what he described as the “three securities”: national security, public security, and safety.

“The Coast Guard has effectively become a 24/7 force protecting Taiwan’s maritime domain,” Hsieh said, adding that this evolution underscores its strategic importance.

CGA’s strategic value

According to Hsieh, Taiwan’s Coast Guard derives its significance from its unique position. Taiwan sits on the front line of democratic resistance to authoritarian expansion, while the Coast Guard is the force directly confronting threats at sea.

China’s pressure campaign has shifted from conventional military threats to a hybrid model — long-term, low-intensity, but highly attritional gray-zone operations.

Hsieh noted that these include repeated incursions by Chinese coast guard vessels near restricted waters around Kinmen, research ships operating in waters around Taiwan and even as far as the second island chain, Guam, and Hawaii, and Chinese-linked vessels lingering near undersea cable zones.

“These are no longer just maritime order issues — they are national security issues,” Hsieh stressed.

Undersea cables as global security concerns

Hsieh emphasized repeatedly that the protection of undersea cables is no longer a simple law enforcement matter, but an emerging global security issue.

Undersea cables, he said, are critical infrastructure connecting the world. Any deliberate or malicious damage would affect not only local communications but also broader regional security and resilience.

“Submarine cables are not a problem for any single country,” he said — highlighting why Taiwan’s experience has drawn international attention.

Hsieh stated that Taiwan has gradually developed a comprehensive response model, covering early warning, monitoring, target identification, trajectory analysis, maritime enforcement, and judicial prosecution. The handling of the Hong Tai No. 58 case through criminal procedures is widely viewed as a representative example.

The Hong Tai No. 58, a Togolese-flagged cargo vessel with Chinese backing, severed the Taiwan–Penghu No. 3 undersea cable off the coast of Beimen, Tainan, in February 2025, causing major communications disruptions. The vessel’s Chinese captain was prosecuted under Taiwan’s Telecommunications Management Act and sentenced to three years in prison in both the first and second trials.

Hsieh said Taiwan’s experience is applicable not only domestically but also to Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and other regions facing risks from shadow fleets and disguised vessels.

For this reason, he argued Taiwan should not be excluded from international maritime cooperation frameworks.

Maritime law enforcement and security are inherently transnational, he noted. Issues such as cable protection, intelligence sharing, tracking suspicious vessels, drug interdiction, and combating cross-border maritime crime all require international collaboration.

Despite Taiwan’s unique diplomatic situation, Hsieh pointed out that coast guards—being law enforcement agencies — carry lower political sensitivity.

He urged the international community to adopt more creative approaches to include Taiwan in cooperation mechanisms, such as intelligence sharing, memoranda of understanding, joint exercises, and professional exchanges.

CGA’s operational doctrine

Addressing how Taiwan responds to Chinese maritime pressure, Hsieh outlined the CGA’s guiding principles: “no retreat, no provocation, and no escalation.”

Chinese coast guard vessels entering waters near Taiwan’s restricted zones aim to harass Taiwan and assert jurisdictional claims, he said, and the CGA’s mission is to counter this through concrete enforcement actions that demonstrate Taiwan’s authority over its waters.

Coast guard vessels monitor such incursions throughout, issue radio warnings, and, when necessary, employ advanced maneuvering techniques to force intruding vessels to withdraw.

While acknowledging the challenges of radio warnings, Hsieh said the CGA also uses LED message boards and ship-handling tactics. “We are not confronting them — we are expelling them,” he said. “Not through collisions, but through maneuvering.”

“When we approach, they repeatedly broadcast, ‘Maintain a safe distance,’” he added.

“So far, our operations have been quite smooth,” Hsieh said. “We consider them successful.”

He noted that this reflects both the professionalism and restraint of frontline personnel, as well as Taiwan’s ability to develop a calibrated response that neither yields ground nor escalates tensions.

Gray-Zone pressure and cognitive warfare

Hsieh also warned that China is combining maritime harassment with cognitive warfare, promoting narratives that attempt to redefine the Taiwan Strait as “internal waters” and even denying the existence of restricted zones around Kinmen and Matsu.

Taiwan’s response, he said, is twofold: firm enforcement and proactive transparency.

Whenever Chinese vessels approach sensitive waters, the CGA dispatches ships to monitor and expel them while simultaneously releasing evidence — images and videos — to the public. In some cases, joint press conferences are held with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to clearly communicate Taiwan’s position to the international community.

“No matter how many times they harass us, it will not affect our sovereignty,” Hsieh said.

Strain on frontline personnel

However, the burden of these operations falls squarely on frontline coast guard personnel.

Hsieh acknowledged that the CGA now faces high-frequency, high-risk, and prolonged operational pressure. Since 2022, frequent Chinese military exercises and the practice of turning off AIS signals have forced the CGA to rely on multi-source intelligence and respond rapidly, he mentioned.

When incidents occur, vessels must be immediately deployed forward, with crews halting rotations and assembling on short notice.

In addition, Hsieh noted, Taiwan’s surrounding waters are often harsh — especially near Penghu, off Taichung, and in the Taiwan Strait during the northeast monsoon season, when strong winds and heavy seas prevail.

“Collisions at sea are extremely dangerous,” Hsieh said. “Our personnel must accomplish their missions while ensuring safety — that is the source of their pressure.”

He added that long deployments at sea mean not only heavy workloads but also difficult living conditions. “In rough seas, even cooking can be a challenge,” he said.

Despite this, coast guard personnel continue to carry out missions — dealing with illegal fishing, conducting rescues, and countering gray-zone threats — with little complaint. Hsieh said they are sustaining Taiwan’s maritime security line with limited manpower and resources, and therefore deserve greater support from both government and society.

Modernization and the future of Taiwan’s Coast Guard

Looking ahead, Hsieh described the CGA as being at a “critical moment of transformation.”

To enhance maritime awareness, reduce manpower burdens, and strengthen interception and early warning capabilities, Taiwan has launched a new wave of technological upgrades and fleet modernization, aiming to significantly boost capabilities by 2027.

Key initiatives include the introduction of drones, unmanned vessels, infrared thermal imaging, and an island-wide surveillance system integrated with AI for automated identification, analysis, and alerts.

These technologies will allow the CGA to distinguish between floating debris, waves, and genuine threats, while improving detection of small or nighttime targets — areas that currently require intensive manpower.

On shipbuilding, Hsieh emphasized that Taiwan will not engage in a tonnage race with China. Instead, it will develop a fleet tailored to operational needs, combining vessels of different sizes and speeds.

“Taiwan’s maritime environment is unique,” he said. “The focus is not on building bigger ships, but on practicality, resilience, and mission suitability.”

On the global stage

Hsieh’s interview delivers a clear message: Taiwan’s Coast Guard is no longer just a maritime law enforcement agency. It has become a key pillar of national security and holds significant strategic value in the global geopolitical landscape.

From countering China’s gray-zone tactics and safeguarding undersea cables to advancing international cooperation and technological modernization, the CGA is playing an increasingly critical role.

For the international community, Taiwan is not only on the frontline of risk — but also on the frontline of experience. For Taiwan, its Coast Guard remains the most crucial force defending that maritime frontline.