Cheng–Xi talks invoke '1992 Consensus' as basis for cross-strait dialogue

Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen (鄭麗文) met with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平) on April 10, with both sides invoking the "1992 Consensus" as a foundation for cross-strait dialogue.

The meeting

At the meeting, Cheng framed the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" as a shared aspiration for people on both sides of the strait, adding that although Taiwan and mainland China operate under different political systems, both sides should "respect each other and move toward one another." 

She called for peace to serve as a shared moral value, urging both sides to move beyond political confrontation and work toward a "community of shared destiny" built on mutually beneficial cooperation. 

Cheng also called on the KMT and the CCP to institutionalize cross-strait peace, proposing  a sustainable dialogue and cooperation mechanism grounded in the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence.

Xi stated that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China, describing China as the shared homeland of the Chinese nation. 

He stressed that the core of cross-strait relations lies in both sides recognizing their common membership in one China, and declared that Taiwan independence is "the chief culprit destroying peace in the Taiwan Strait" and will "never be tolerated."

He concluded by urging both parties to strengthen political trust, expand exchanges, promote Chinese culture, and advance peaceful cross-strait development.

Political reactions in Taiwan

Before the meeting, President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) took to Facebook to warn that "compromising with authoritarian forces only comes at the cost of sovereignty and democracy" and will not bring freedom or peace. He urged opposition parties to pass the defense budget without delay.

Following the meeting, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) issued a statement critical of the talks. 

The MAC charged that the shared political platform of the KMT and CCP "aims to eliminate the Republic of China (official name for Taiwan)," and that the positions expressed by the two parties' leaders amounted to an upgraded version of Beijing's Taiwan policy. 

The council argued that Cheng's proposed "peace framework" was in fact a "unification framework," and that "institutionalizing cross-strait peace" was tantamount to Beijing's "one country, two systems" formula for Taiwan. The MAC also accused Beijing of attempting to treat the cross-strait issue as a domestic matter through the meeting, and called on the CCP to engage constructively with Taiwan's democratically elected government.

KMT Vice Chairman Chang Jung-kung (張榮恭), who accompanied Cheng on the trip, pushed back at the MAC, saying its characterization of institutionalized cross-strait peace as a "one country, two systems" scheme reflected a troubling lack of knowledge. 

He also noted that the very existence of the MAC and the Straits Exchange Foundation demonstrated that cross-strait relations are "absolutely not a state-to-state relationship" — otherwise, he argued, President Lai would have every right to immediately dissolve both bodies.

Short-term thaw, long-term uncertainty

Political analysts offered a cautious reading of the meeting's significance.

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a political science professor at National Cheng Kung University, told TCN that the meeting may temporarily ease tensions cross the strait but is unlikely to alter China’s long-term strategy, which includes military drills, influence operations, and political pressure.

Infiltration, cognitive warfare, military exercises — none of these will truly stop because of the Cheng-Xi meeting, Wang noted. "In the short term, Beijing may dial things back slightly, but over the medium to long term, it will revert to its established playbook," Wang said.

Wang added that with Donald Trump in the White House, significant uncertainty remains over the medium to long term, and that China's calculus toward Taiwan would need to be watched through at least 2028. "As long as Lai Ching-te is in office and the DPP is governing, China will maintain this distinction: it can engage with the KMT, but it won't show goodwill toward the DPP," he said.

Chang Yuan-hsiang (張元祥), an adjunct professor of political science at Soochow University and a cross-strait relations expert, told TCN that while China has the capability to act militarily against Taiwan, the costs would be prohibitive.

"Even if Beijing won, it would end up with a destroyed Taiwan — which offers no real benefit," he said. 

Chang argued that as long as Taiwan does not formally declare legal independence, China is unlikely to use force, and that current military exercises and threats are "more for the domestic audience and hardliners within China."

The 1992 Consensus

Both Cheng and Xi explicitly invoked the 1992 Consensus during their talks — a significant moment given the KMT's increasingly cautious handling of the term in recent years following its 2016 electoral defeat.

Chang noted that the emphasis on "the Chinese nation," the reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus, and the firm opposition to Taiwan independence were all to be expected.

He argued that Cheng's visit marked a deliberate pivot toward "strategic clarity" in directly confronting the DPP, in contrast to the "strategic ambiguity" the KMT had adopted in recent years to broaden its electoral appeal.

Wang, however, flagged a meaningful departure from past KMT framing. Traditionally, he noted, KMT references to the 1992 Consensus were paired with the principle of "one China, respective interpretations" — a formulation designed to preserve space for the Republic of China's sovereign status within an ambiguous "one China" framework. 

For example, when Cheng was elected party chair, the KMT, in its reply to a congratulatory message from the CCP, stated: “In 1992, both sides of the Strait reached a consensus to verbally express adherence to the one-China principle in their respective formulations.” 

"That part has now been dropped," Wang said, replaced simply by opposition to Taiwan independence. "This effectively abandons the KMT's long-standing effort to maintain the ROC's sovereign standing within that ambiguous space."

Wang also questioned what "opposing Taiwan independence" actually means in this context — noting that if left undefined and accepted on Beijing's terms, the KMT risks endorsing a narrative that denies the ROC's independent existence.

Implications for the future Trump-Xi summit

A Trump-Xi summit, originally expected in April, has been pushed back to May due to the Iran War — meaning the Cheng-Xi meeting preceded it.

Wang argued that Beijing is using the meeting to construct a narrative ahead of any Trump-Xi talks: that cross-strait tensions are easing, that Taiwan's political landscape is not monolithic, and therefore that outside intervention is unnecessary.

"Once that impression is established, other countries that want to speak up for Taiwan or help Taiwan may find their legitimacy undermined," Wang said.

Wang further suggested that Xi could use the meeting as leverage with Washington on arms sales to Taiwan, arguing that if cross-strait peace talks are already underway, the US should scale back military support. "Even if sales aren't cancelled immediately, Beijing will use this to apply greater pressure going forward," he said.

Chang, from another point of view, believed the Trump-Xi summit would largely proceed on its own terms. 

He did, however, suggest the Cheng-Xi meeting could affect the agenda's priorities — with Beijing now feeling more confident that Taiwan's internal dynamics have shifted, the urgency of pressing Washington on the Taiwan question may ease somewhat. "Taiwan may move down the agenda," Chang said, "even if it remains on it."