Taiwan public divided on KMT leader's meeting with Xi, polls show

Multiple opinion polls have painted a complex and sometimes contradictory picture of public sentiment in Taiwan following a mid-April meeting in Beijing between Kuomintang (KMT) Chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).

Poll results

A survey released April 28 by My-Formosa Poll found that 53.7% of respondents believe increased cross-strait exchanges could help reduce hostility and benefit Taiwan. 

However, 51.1% said the Cheng-Xi meeting would not help prevent war or safeguard Taiwan’s status and overall interests, compared with 37.6% who said it would.

The same poll showed strong opposition to Beijing’s “peaceful reunification” framework, under which Taiwan would become a province or special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), similar to Hong Kong or Macau. A total of 68.2% said they would not accept such terms, while only 22.4% expressed support.

A separate poll published April 23 by TVBS offered a somewhat more positive assessment. 

The TVBS poll found that 43% of respondents believed the meeting would promote peaceful cross-strait development, while 39% disagreed. Meanwhile, 46% considered the meeting successful, compared with 31% who viewed it as unsuccessful.

The TVBS poll also indicated that 66% of respondents support resuming official cross-strait negotiations, and 46% support continuing relations based on the so-called “1992 Consensus.”

The 1992 Consensus refers to a 1992 understanding between Taipei and Beijing that there is only one China, but each side may interpret what "China" means. The “China” recognized by Taipei is the Republic of China (ROC).

Another survey, released April 23 by the Democracy Foundation, highlighted broader anxieties. It found that 55.2% of respondents believe Taiwan can no longer maintain the “status quo” indefinitely and must eventually choose between change and continuity. 

At the same time, 67.4% expressed concern that failing to maintain the status quo could lead to the loss of their current way of life and rights.

The same poll showed that 70.5% prefer proactive negotiations to shape Taiwan’s future rather than passively accepting external arrangements.

Meanwhile, a poll published April 22 by Z.Media found that 44.5% of respondents believe the Cheng–Xi meeting will not significantly benefit the KMT in Taiwan’s 2026 local elections, exceeding the 33.2% who see it as advantageous.

Support for exchanges, distrust of Beijing

Speaking to TCN, political scientist Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁) of National Cheng Kung University said Taiwanese support for “cross-strait exchanges” primarily refers to social and economic interactions — such as people-to-people contact, education, and tourism — similar to Taiwan’s exchanges with countries like Japan or the United States.

However, Wang emphasized that this support does not extend to the Chinese political system. He noted that many Taiwanese hold negative views of the Chinese Communist regime, citing its authoritarian nature and leadership style.

Chang Yuan-hsiang (張元祥), an adjunct professor at Soochow University, said that support for peace, exchanges, and negotiations across the Taiwan Strait consistently represents a “mainstream opinion” of the population, cutting across party lines — though it is often less vocal.

Chang added that divisions in public opinion stem less from attitudes toward peace or engagement, and more from differing levels of trust or distrust toward mainland China. 

These differences, he noted, often correlate with party affiliation, with supporters of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) generally expressing greater skepticism and hostility.

Competing narratives

Wang also observed a growing “competition of narratives” within Taiwan following the Cheng–Xi meeting, as different political forces promote diverging interpretations of cross-strait relations.

He pointed to emerging arguments that downplay the importance of maintaining the status quo, instead prioritizing economic development and even suggesting that unification could be discussed. 

Some of these narratives also advocate reducing defense spending in favor of expanding social welfare. Wang said such positions appear strategically aimed at reshaping public attitudes toward sovereignty and security.

He also noted another possible narrative trend calling for cross-strait issues to be resolved solely by the two sides, with reduced emphasis on US involvement. 

Wang argued that such views overlook the internationalized nature of the Taiwan issue and Taiwan’s longstanding reliance on global support, particularly its close ties with the United States.

Diverging visions of negotiation

According to Chang, supporters across Taiwan’s political spectrum — including KMT, DPP, Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and independents — generally agree on the need for cross-strait negotiations. However, their visions of what such negotiations entail differ sharply.

Chang said that KMT supporters tend to view negotiations as a process leading to closer economic and cultural cooperation. 

In contrast, Chang noted, DPP supporters often see negotiations — conducted without accepting the “1992 Consensus” — as government-to-government talks that would implicitly signal concessions from Beijing, with the goal of clearly defining a “two-state” relationship.

Preconditions remain a barrier

Following the Cheng–Xi meeting, Beijing introduced 10 policy measures aimed at promoting cross-strait exchanges and cooperation, including restoring previously suspended economic and exchange mechanisms.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council responded April 21, reiterating that any negotiations involving public authority must proceed without political preconditions and on an equal footing with Taiwan’s democratically elected government.

The council also stressed the need to safeguard Taiwan’s overall national interests, warning against allowing cross-strait exchanges to fall under unilateral control by Beijing. It urged businesses to recognize the risks inherent in China’s Taiwan policy and to align with the government in calling for a return to established interaction mechanisms.

Wang said Taiwan must meet three conditions to safeguard its interests in any negotiations: avoiding acceptance of pre-set conditions, maintaining sufficient economic and military strength, and securing international backing — especially from major democratic countries.

Without these, he warned, negotiations would be fundamentally unequal and potentially detrimental to Taiwan.

Chang, meanwhile, expressed skepticism that official cross-strait talks could resume under the current DPP administration. 

He said the key obstacle lies in the “foundation for dialogue,” noting that Beijing considers the “1992 Consensus” essential, while the DPP firmly rejects it.