Taiwan passes opposition-backed special arms budget amid force readiness concerns

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed a special defense procurement bill on May 8, approving a version put forward by the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) that caps spending at NT$780 billion (approximately US$24 billion) and excludes all commercial purchases and commissioned production contracts.

The legislation, formally titled the "Special Act for Safeguarding National Security and Strengthening Asymmetric Combat Power Procurement," is structured in two phases. The first phase allocates up to NT$300 billion for the purchase of M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-armor drone-missile systems, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and TOW 2B anti-armor missiles.

A second phase would make available an additional NT$480 billion, contingent on foreign governments agreeing within one year of the act's enactment to sell Taiwan soft- and hard-kill counter-drone systems, various anti-ballistic and air defense missiles, low-to-medium altitude air defense systems, and anti-armor missile stockpile replenishment packages.

Following the bill's passage, the Presidential Office moved quickly, issuing a presidential decree on May 11 to promulgate the act.

MND response

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) responded on the evening of May 8, saying that the legislation would undermine the coherence of its force-building plans and risk creating capability gaps.

The MND stated several critical programs had been cut, including the domestically developed "Strong Bow" medium-range anti-ballistic missile system — described as the backbone of "Taiwan's Shield" — as well as various drone systems, anti-drone platforms, suicide unmanned surface vessels, AI-assisted intelligence and decision-support modules, the Tactical Assault Kit (TAK), and the Taiwan Tactical Network (TTN). 

The ministry cautioned that excluding these items could delay the development of asymmetric warfare and AI-enabled combat capabilities, hampering the formation of a complete kill chain.

Kuo Yu-jen (郭育仁), director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University and a defense policy expert, agreed with the ministry's assessment. 

He told TCN that while the final version was less severe than an earlier KMT proposal that would have made more aggressive cuts, the approved scale still falls short of the original plan and has caused "substantive harm" to Taiwan's defense development.

Effect on Trump-Xi talks?

The bill's passage comes as US President Donald Trump prepares to visit China from May 13 to 15. 

Speaking at the White House on May 11, Trump said he would raise the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan in his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), noting that "President Xi would like us not to, and I'll have that discussion. That's one of the many things I'll be talking about."

Kuo said the outcome of Taiwan's defense budget debate could generate US frustration and affect the timeline of future arms sales. 

He noted that the original defense special budget proposal stood at approximately NT$1.25 trillion, which, spread over eight years, would have pushed Taiwan's defense spending to roughly 3.4% of GDP — close to NATO's benchmark. The approved NT$780 billion, with an estimated NT$600 billion actually available for procurement, falls well short of U.S. expectations, he added.

With US-China summit diplomacy intensifying — including multiple anticipated meetings between Trump and Xi this year — Kuo said Taiwan's comparatively passive stance may prompt Washington to delay announcing new arms sales as a tactical concession to Beijing.

He added that the US currently has an approximately US$14 billion arms package pending formal announcement, including Patriot PAC-3 and surface-to-air missiles. 

Washington may not formally disclose the next round of arms sales until late this year or even spring 2027, effectively delaying Taiwan's asymmetric capability buildup by nearly another year, Kuo said.

Juichou Richard Hu (胡瑞舟), a retired major general and deputy director at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies at National Chengchi University, told TCN that China would inevitably protest any large-scale Taiwan arms sale to Washington, and could use high-level US-China interactions to press for a reconsideration. 

Hu noted that if Trump requires Chinese cooperation on other issues, the risk of some form of concession to Beijing on Taiwan arms sales is a contingency Taipei must carefully assess in advance.

What was cut

During legislative deliberations, the MND had publicly disclosed — with classified details redacted — the broad contours of seven procurement categories: precision artillery, long-range precision strike missiles, unmanned vehicles and counter-drone systems, air defense and anti-ballistic and anti-armor missiles, AI-assisted and C5ISR systems, operational sustainment equipment, and joint Taiwan-U.S. research and co-procurement programs.

The final legislation retained all precision artillery and long-range precision strike missile items, but cut across every other category. Excluded items include: 32 Jian Hsiang II reconnaissance drones commissioned from the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST); 1,446 coastal surveillance drones to be produced by the Armaments Bureau; 280 commercially purchased vertical take-off and landing smart drones; two domestically produced Strong Bow anti-ballistic missile systems from CSIST; commercially procured ammunition, military batteries, and armored vehicle assembly production lines; AI-assisted and C5ISR systems; and all jointly developed and co-purchased Taiwan-US equipment.

Kuo stated that this procurement is not routine purchasing — it reflects recommendations made by US military planners based on assessments of the Taiwan Strait situation. 

He cited the original plan to acquire 82 additional HIMARS systems as a direct response to the threat of a large-scale Chinese amphibious landing operation, noting that the US military has never sold such a large quantity of HIMARS to any single country. 

The system's battlefield effectiveness has been demonstrated in Ukraine, he said, and newly tested US precision munitions now reach beyond 500 kilometers, with the latest Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) exceeding 1,000 kilometers — providing significant strike and deterrent capability against massing or landing PLA forces.

Kuo also noted that China has recently conducted multiple large-scale amphibious landing exercises along its southeastern coast, involving roll-on/roll-off vessels, amphibious armored vehicles, and floating sea bridges — the very threat calculus behind US urgency on Taiwan's asymmetric buildup.

On the cuts to domestic drone procurement, Kuo said the delays would similarly set back Taiwan's asymmetric warfare capacity. He cited a recent report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) arguing that scaling up drone numbers would help Taiwan realize a "hellscape" defense concept, but that the postponement of these programs would inevitably degrade overall defensive capability.

Hu said that the MND's original plan reflected a defense posture increasingly oriented toward asymmetric warfare and better aligned with Taiwan's own defensive needs. 

He noted, however, that Taiwan's limited geographic area means military installations, troop deployment sites, defense industrial facilities, key command posts, and even political targets could all be struck in an opening wave of a large-scale, rapid-tempo offensive. 

Even with adequate asymmetric equipment, Hu said, Taiwan must seriously consider whether its command systems and forces could survive an initial surprise attack and continue to function.

Implementation challenges

The special procurement act runs from 2026 to 2033.

Given the tense security environment in the Taiwan Strait, any failure by the US to deliver purchased equipment on time would disrupt overall defense planning, Hu said, delivery schedules will be a central challenge.

Hu noted that US munitions and weapons stockpiles are already under strain due to ongoing conflicts and allied demand, and that China's restrictions on rare earth exports to some American defense contractors could introduce further supply chain and delivery uncertainties.

Beyond procurement itself, Hu flagged manpower, storage, and logistics maintenance as major concerns. 

Taiwan's high humidity and salt-laden air can degrade weapons and munitions without proper storage and maintenance conditions, he said. The MND must simultaneously audit ammunition depot capacity, base infrastructure, and logistics support — not simply focus on what it buys.