Lai marks two years in office with vow that Taiwan's future lies with its people

President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) on May 20 delivered a speech marking the second anniversary of his inauguration, declaring that Taiwan’s future “cannot be decided by forces outside our borders, nor can it be held hostage by fear, division, or short-term gain,” and must instead “be determined together by our 23 million people.”

Lai reaffirmed that maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait remains Taiwan's core national strategic objective. 

He said Taiwan is willing to engage in “healthy and orderly” exchanges with China on the “principles of parity and dignity,” but firmly rejected what he described as “united front tactics that package unification as peace.”

Lai said Taiwan values peace and dialogue, but would not accept political subordination or sacrifice its sovereignty and democratic way of life.

Notably, Lai did not repeat the phrase “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” a formulation he used during his 2024 inaugural address. The wording has now been absent from both his 2025 and 2026 anniversary speeches. 

Instead, this year’s address framed cross-strait issues around opposition to united front infiltration, resistance to external attempts to alter the status quo, and the principle that Taiwan’s future should be decided by its own people.

However, during a media Q&A session following the speech, Lai stated that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, Taiwan is not part of the People’s Republic of China — this is an ironclad fact and one recognized by the international community.”

Security and defense issues also featured prominently in the address. Lai said his administration has spent the past two years advancing defense reforms, strengthening asymmetric warfare capabilities, enhancing civil resilience, and building a more comprehensive homeland security network.

He said increased defense spending is intended “not to provoke, but to prevent war,” adding that the government would expand unmanned systems and intelligent defense capabilities across land, sea, and air domains through supplemental budgets, international cooperation, and efforts to localize Taiwan’s defense industry.

Response to Trump?

Huang Kwei-bo (黃奎博), a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, told TCN that the core theme of Lai’s speech remained opposition to unification and that the president had not abandoned what Huang described as a “pragmatic Taiwan independence” political orientation.

China sees self-ruled Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, as a breakaway province and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve unification.

Huang said Lai continued to avoid explicitly emphasizing that “the Republic of China is a sovereign independent state.” Instead, Lai interwove references to “ROC Taiwan” and “Taiwan” with positive concepts such as democracy and goodwill in an apparent attempt to soften concerns over his pro-independence image.

After returning from his China visit, US President Donald Trump said in a May 16 interview that he was “not looking to have somebody go independent,” while urging both Taipei and Beijing to “cool down.” 

Huang said the May summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) may have produced a tacit understanding resembling “technical joint management of Taiwan independence” between Washington and Beijing. 

Huang argued that Lai’s toned-down rhetoric in the formal speech text may have reflected pressure from the US to avoid overtly pro-independence language.

Maintaining an existing tone?

Kuo Yu-jen (郭育仁), director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University, offered a different interpretation, arguing that Lai’s speech was not a response to the recent Trump-Xi meeting, but rather a continuation of the more moderate tone adopted since his 2025 anniversary address.

Kuo told TCN that Lai’s major public addresses over the past year have already differed significantly from his 2024 inaugural speech, including the omission of references to “non-subordination” between the ROC and PRC.

According to Kuo, Lai’s May 20 speech primarily focused on Taiwan’s economic, technological, social, and cultural development, while emphasizing that a sovereign and independent country will not change because of threats, a tone he said closely resembled last year’s Double Ten address.

Trump will speak to Lai?

While returning from China aboard Air Force One on May 15, Trump responded to questions about US arms sales to Taiwan by saying a decision would be made soon and that he would first speak with “the person that’s running Taiwan.”

Asked on May 20 whether he would speak with Lai before deciding on arms sales, Trump replied, “I’ll speak to him.” He added, “We have that situation very well in hand. We had a great meeting with President Xi ... we’ll work on that, the Taiwan problem.”

Kuo said recent perceptions of a shift in Trump’s attitude toward Taiwan may stem less from US-China interactions and more from dissatisfaction within the Trump administration over Taiwan’s passage of a reduced NT$780 billion (approximately US$25 billion) special defense budget package instead of the originally proposed NT$1.25 trillion version.

According to Kuo, some procurement items included conditions requiring the US to complete certain procedures before Taiwan could release funding, a mechanism he said “violates regular US foreign military sales practices” and may have “angered Trump.”

Kuo said he remained pessimistic about the short-term approval of a proposed US$14 billion arms package for Taiwan. 

He suggested greater clarity may not emerge until after a possible Trump-Xi meeting in September, with any announcement potentially delayed until late September or early November — effectively pushing Taiwan’s procurement schedule back by at least one to one-and-a-half years.

Kuo also pointed to recent remarks by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who emphasized in a media interview that Congress plays a major role in Taiwan arms sales. 

Kuo said earlier public calls by the US State Department and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) urging Taiwan to quickly pass the special defense budget now appeared more like a “friendly warning,” reflecting Trump’s strong focus on Taiwan arms sales issues.

China factor

Huang offered a somewhat different assessment, saying the key variable shaping Trump’s Taiwan arms sales policy remains the broader strategic interaction and trade negotiations between Washington and Beijing, rather than Taiwan’s own position.

Huang said Taiwan has consistently sought to purchase US weapons, meaning the more important factor is how US-China bargaining and engagement ultimately influence Washington’s Taiwan policy.

US-China-Taiwan relations

Huang said the Lai administration may now need to focus more on reducing perceptions of a “Taiwan independence” label and reassuring Washington politically.

He argued that the US is not currently demanding that Taiwan improve cross-strait relations through specific technical measures, meaning the Lai government is unlikely to proactively alter its current policy approach.

Huang added that with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) facing electoral pressure ahead of year-end elections, maintaining a strong anti-China stance would remain an important strategy for consolidating its support base, making improved cross-strait relations unlikely to become a near-term policy priority.

Kuo said the overall trajectory of cross-strait relations is unlikely to see substantial improvement.

He identified two developments most likely to trigger renewed tensions: a possible overseas trip by Lai to Central or South America later this year involving transit through the US mainland, and whether Washington announces a new major arms sales package for Taiwan.