China’s new ethnic unity law raises legal risks for Taiwanese, expert says

China’s new ethnic unity law represents a form of gray-zone legal warfare that could expose Taiwanese people to legal risks, restrict cross-strait exchanges, and produce a chilling effect through its potential extraterritorial application, according to Taiwan’s government and a Taiwanese expert.

On July 1, China officially implemented its Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which explicitly states that “overseas organizations and individuals” can be held legally liable for actions that undermine ethnic unity and progress or promote ethnic separatism.

China sees self-ruled Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, as a breakaway province and has not ruled out the use of force to unify the island.

Taiwan's response

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said on July 2 that the law poses three major threats to Taiwan. The council said it imposes a legal obligation on Taiwanese people to safeguard and promote unification, compels self-censorship through vague provisions, and subjects Taiwan and its people to China’s domestic jurisdiction, undermining Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity.

Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) said on July 2 that China was gradually shifting its legal warfare against Taiwan from “using business interests to exert political pressure” to “using the law to promote unification.”

Cho stated that Beijing would likely use an expanding range of legal instruments to increase political pressure on Taiwanese individuals, businesses, organizations and youth exchange programs, compelling participants to state their political positions.

A new form of gray-zone activity

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a political science professor at National Cheng Kung University, told TCN that China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress represents a new form of gray-zone activity and can be classified as part of Beijing’s legal warfare against Taiwan.

Wang said the impact of such legal warfare does not necessarily depend on what the law specifically prohibits. 

Rather, Wang indicated, its significance lies in the ambiguity of its provisions and the potential for extraterritorial application, which could have a chilling effect on Taiwanese society.

The law could increase risks for Taiwanese people who travel to, work in, or express their views in China, with Wang noting that those potentially affected include not only political figures but also academics, journalists, religious figures, business executives, civil servants, and ordinary travelers.

In the past, cross-strait economic, religious and cultural exchanges could generally take place without political preconditions, he said. However, as Beijing increasingly politicizes civilian exchanges, the space for maintaining such interactions is likely to shrink, Wang added.

Cases involving Taiwanese in China

The MAC began publishing statistics in 2024 on Taiwanese citizens reported missing or facing other difficulties in China. 

The data cover three categories: people reported missing, those detained for questioning and those suspected of having their personal freedom restricted.

According to the latest figures, 55 Taiwanese citizens were reported missing in China in 2024. The number rose to 221 in 2025, while 98 cases were recorded in the first six months of 2026.

Straits Exchange Foundation Vice Chairman and Secretary-General Luo Wen-jia (羅文嘉) said in late 2025 that some Taiwanese citizens reported missing in China had been deprived of their freedom in cases involving alleged fraud, religious activities or other circumstances.

MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh (梁文傑) said on July 16 that the government had received information that a serving police officer and a retired officer were detained and questioned by Chinese state security personnel while traveling together in China’s Fujian Province in June.

The two were forcibly taken from their guesthouse to another location, where they were held in isolation and questioned, Liang said.

People need clear guidelines

Wang offered three recommendations for how the Taiwanese government should respond.

First, the government should formulate clear legal-risk guidelines and systematically categorize the potential risks facing academics, journalists, business executives, civil servants and ordinary travelers, Wang said. 

The guidelines should also explain what kinds of statements, articles, publications or activities China might regard as illegal, he said.

Second, the government should establish reporting and emergency-assistance mechanisms for Taiwanese citizens traveling to China, Hong Kong or Macao. Despite the risks, some Taiwanese will continue to travel to these places for work, family visits, study or other reasons, Wang said.

The government should therefore provide clear and publicly accessible contact information and reporting channels, while ensuring that travelers understand before departure what assistance may be available if they encounter difficulties, he added.

Third, Wang said Taiwan could work with Japan, South Korea and other like-minded countries to establish a multinational database on China’s legal warfare. 

Such a database could track how Beijing uses laws such as the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, the National Security Law, the Counter-Espionage Law and other legislation related to unification to pressure academics, journalists, businesses and civil society actors from different countries, Wang added.

Effects on cross-strait interaction

Wang said Beijing’s legal and political demands could further erode the flexible or deliberately ambiguous middle ground that previously existed in cross-strait interactions.

Beijing is no longer merely demanding that Taiwanese people oppose “Taiwan independence,” he said. 

Beijing increasingly requires them to accept political narratives defined by China, including “national unification” and the concept of a “Chinese national community,” Wang added.

“This will leave Taiwanese society with less room to interpret political positions flexibly and weaken the original functions of cross-strait exchanges,” Wang said.

Such measures are also likely to deepen Taiwanese society’s distrust and suspicion of China, reinforcing public skepticism toward Beijing, he said.

In addition, Wang said the policy could backfire on Beijing by further internationalizing the Taiwan issue. 

If China attempts to apply its domestic laws to individuals or activities overseas, other countries will question how Beijing intends to enforce them and whether such actions infringe upon their jurisdiction and fundamental rights, Wang said.

Risks facing Taiwanese officials

Wang said concerns over the law’s implications for Taiwanese officials traveling abroad or conducting diplomatic work could be greater in countries with particularly close ties to China.

This may be especially true in some Southeast Asian and Global South countries that have long voiced strong support for Beijing’s “one China” policy, he said.

No representative case has yet emerged to clearly demonstrate how the new law will be enforced, making it difficult to determine its actual scope of application in the short term, Wang said.

In the meantime, individuals and businesses are likely to adopt a more cautious approach and may voluntarily avoid discussing subjects that could be considered sensitive.

China’s definitions of conduct that “undermines unification” or constitutes “seditious speech” could be highly ambiguous, Wang said. People may therefore find it difficult to determine in advance which statements, books or activities could violate the law.

If Taiwan’s government cannot clearly explain what assistance or remedies it can provide, the uncertainty could further heighten public anxiety, he added.

Wang assessed that the law is more likely to be enforced in territories under China’s effective control or jurisdiction. 

Attempts to enforce it elsewhere would raise questions about jurisdiction, legal legitimacy and whether third countries would cooperate, Wang added.