Taiwan’s reported hypersonic missile breakthrough could strengthen deterrence, experts say

Taiwanese media have reported a major breakthrough in Taiwan’s indigenous hypersonic cruise missile program, which experts say could significantly strengthen the country’s deterrence and self-defense capabilities if confirmed and mass-produced.

Breakthrough

Recent reports citing military sources said Taiwan’s domestically developed hypersonic cruise missile program has made substantial progress and could receive dedicated funding in the Ministry of National Defense’s 2027 budget. 

The missile is reportedly derived from the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology’s (NCSIST) long-running Yun Feng II program and has been formally redesignated the Ching Tien Hypersonic Cruise Missile. 

It is reportedly capable of reaching speeds of Mach 3 to Mach 5, with an estimated range of 1,200 to 2,000 kilometers. NCSIST has not publicly confirmed those specifications.

The reports emerged shortly after China Central Television (CCTV) aired a series of PLA anniversary-themed programs in late July and early August, which showed, for the first time, China’s YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile being launched from a Type 052D destroyer. 

Credibility of the reports

Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Wang Ting-yu (王定宇), a member of the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, said reports that the Defense Ministry could earmark funding for a hypersonic cruise missile in next year’s budget could not yet be independently confirmed and should be assessed against official ministry statements.

Wang said Taiwan’s accumulated missile research, development and manufacturing capabilities should not be underestimated. 

Information related to the Yun Feng II program has long been classified, he said, adding that while reports about the Ching Tien missile could not be verified at this stage, the armed forces and NCSIST may possess more advanced technological capabilities than the public realizes.

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told TCN that the reports had some basis and that Taiwan’s indigenous hypersonic missile could be only one step away from mass production.

Su said publicly available information indicated that Taiwan had acquired equipment capable of producing large solid-propellant grains for rocket motors in recent years, potentially marking an important technological milestone and reflecting a more open US approach toward Taiwan’s related capabilities.

A larger single-stage booster could allow a missile to climb to higher altitudes, extending its range and improving flight performance, he said.

Strategic significance

Wang said Taiwan’s development of a hypersonic cruise missile would be intended not for external expansion or offensive use, but to strengthen deterrence. 

If Taiwan possessed a high-speed counterstrike capability with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers, China would have to factor Taiwan’s potential retaliatory reach into decisions about where to locate airfields, ports, command facilities and troop assembly areas that could be used to threaten Taiwan, he said.

Such a capability could push some Chinese military facilities and deployments farther from Taiwan, increasing Taiwan’s warning time and defensive depth, Wang added.

Su said success in developing in Taiwan’s indigenous hypersonic missile program would carry both military and strategic significance. 

Militarily, it would expand Taiwan’s arsenal for counterstrikes against potential sources of attack. Strategically, it could signal greater US confidence in Taiwan’s relevant technologies and industrial capacity, Su added.

Taiwan would classify such weapons as counterstrike weapons rather than preemptive strike systems, Su said. Taiwan’s strategy is neither to strike first nor to frame its posture solely in terms of a “second strike,” but to retain the ability to retaliate after an attack and thereby strengthen deterrence. 

He said the approach could be understood through the framework of “defensive realism”: Taiwan maintains a defensive policy, but must possess sufficient counterstrike capability to raise the cost of aggression and preserve peace. 

“The central objective remains strengthening indigenous defense and deterrence,” Su said.

Potential path to deployment

If a hypersonic missile program is included in the Defense Ministry’s 2027 budget and funding is approved, Taiwan could deliver an initial pre-production model within about a year, Su said. 

The program is not new, he noted, but has been under development for nearly two decades.

Su said the project had once been shelved, although its technical team retained its research and development capacity. 

In recent years, the design has reportedly shifted from a cluster of multiple booster rockets to a more powerful, technologically mature single-stage solid-rocket configuration, Su added.

In 2022, NCSIST cooperated with US firm B&P Littleford to obtain large-scale propellant-mixing equipment, giving Taiwan the capacity to manufacture larger propulsion units, Su said. 

He described the acquisition as a potentially important technological turning point that also reflected Washington’s more open attitude.

Taiwan could not produce an unlimited number of such missiles, Su said. However, he estimated that at least 300 counterstrike missiles could be needed to establish credible deterrence, based on potential military targets along China’s coast near Taiwan, including airfields, ports and command facilities.

Challenges ahead

Su said potential challenges to fielding the missile include acquiring and integrating mobile launch vehicles, as the new missile would likely need to be deployed on mobile platforms rather than at fixed sites.

Other issues include selecting deployment locations. If the missile’s range is significantly extended, eastern Taiwan could become a potential deployment area, he said. 

A further challenge would be autonomy over critical components and supply chains: if certain key parts cannot be manufactured domestically, supplier countries could influence production volumes and delivery schedules, Su added.

Su said Taiwan can now produce most key technologies domestically, including laser gyroscopes that were once considered particularly sensitive. 

Su noted, foreign factors are therefore more likely to affect regulatory oversight of a limited number of equipment items and raw materials than to impose broad restrictions on mass production.

Wang regarded the legislative budget review process as a major challenge. 

Building defense capabilities depends on sustained budgetary support, he said, warning that delays in reviewing the annual central government budget could affect force-building programs, including missile defense systems and any new hypersonic cruise missile program.

No matter how advanced the capabilities of Taiwan’s armed forces and NCSIST may be, or how much technology and equipment the US is willing to provide, defense modernization will remain constrained if budgets are not approved in time, Wang said.