Japan’s new defense white paper softens language on Taiwan, but policy remains unchanged, experts say

Japan’s latest defense white paper uses more cautious language on Taiwan, but Taiwanese experts say it does not signal a policy shift and may instead reflect efforts to improve ties with China. 

The white paper

Japan’s Ministry of Defense released its Defense of Japan 2026 white paper on Aug. 4, echoing its assessment from the previous year by describing China as Japan’s “greatest strategic challenge.”

In its assessment of the Taiwan Strait, the new white paper said the overall cross-strait military balance is rapidly tilting in China’s favor. Beijing, it said, has not renounced the use of force and continues to increase its military activities around Taiwan.

Notably, however, the 2026 white paper omitted wording from the previous edition describing stability in the Taiwan Strait as crucial to Japan’s security. It retained only the statement that stability across the Taiwan Strait is vital to the stability of the international community, reflecting a more cautious approach to Taiwan-related issues.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian (林劍) said on Aug. 5 that the Defense of Japan 2026 white paper again made “groundless accusations” against China, repeated the so-called “China threat” narrative, and grossly interfered in China’s internal affairs through what Beijing described as irresponsible remarks on Taiwan.

China “deplores and firmly rejects” the report and has lodged serious representations with Japan, Lin said. 

Japan’s Taiwan policy

Kuo Yu-jen (郭育仁), director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University, told TCN that the removal of more direct references in the new white paper — such as language suggesting that a Taiwan contingency is directly related to Japan’s national security — does not indicate a substantive shift in Tokyo’s Taiwan policy.

Rather, Kuo said, it is more likely a temporary and tactical effort by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's administration to maintain a lower profile amid domestic political pressure and efforts to improve relations with China.

Kuo said the Takaichi administration has recently faced falling approval ratings and domestic pressure over the economy and rising prices. At the same time, China’s pressure on Japan over supply-chains, including rare earths, has heightened concerns in Japan’s business community about Tokyo’s China policy.

He said the Japanese government may hope to secure a meeting between Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) before the APEC summit in November to ease bilateral tensions. Against this backdrop, Japanese officials have adopted relatively cautious and conservative language on Taiwan in recent months, he said.

Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), expressed a similar view. He told TCN that the decision to soften or remove sensitive Taiwan-related language from the white paper was mainly driven by diplomatic considerations regarding Japan-China relations and does not represent a substantive change in Japan’s Taiwan or Taiwan Strait security policy.

Japan may have avoided overly direct Taiwan-related language in the report to reduce friction with China, Shen said. 

However, the basic direction of Japan’s Taiwan security policy remains unchanged, and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait remain closely linked to Japan’s security, Shen added.

Strategic communication

Although the new white paper devotes considerable attention to China’s continued military expansion, which it describes as Japan’s "greatest strategic challenge," Japanese officials remain cautious in their wording, Kuo said.

Japan has not explicitly classified China as a “security threat,” he noted. 

North Korea and Russia remain the countries most clearly identified as security threats in official Japanese documents, while China is still characterized as a “strategic challenge,” Kuo said.

Kuo said Japan’s continued reinforcement of defense resources in its southwestern islands, alongside China’s ongoing military modernization and air and maritime operations, will make competition between the two countries more pronounced. 

However, Kuo said that because both sides have a relatively clear understanding of each other’s strategic intentions and military deployments, this could also help reduce the risk of miscalculation or unintended clashes.

Kuo viewed Japan’s defense white paper as a tool for strategic communication. He noted that by publishing transparent official documents, Japan clarifies its security assessments, military deployments, and policy directions — helping neighboring countries, including China, understand its intent and avoid miscalculations.

Shen shared that view, saying that strategic communication and policy transparency are among the white paper’s most important functions.

By publicly outlining its future defense policy, capability development and threat assessments, Japan aims to reduce miscalculation rather than deliberately provoke China, Shen said.

Risk of conflict

China may nevertheless continue responding to Japan’s security and sovereignty claims through gray-zone operations, Shen said. 

These could include stepped-up coast guard activity around the Diaoyutai Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, or an expanded military and law-enforcement presence in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and waters east of Taiwan, Shen said.

Such actions could raise regional tensions and challenge Japan’s sovereignty or maritime rights claims, he said. However, the risk of a full-scale military conflict between China and Japan remains relatively low.

Taiwan-Japan relations

Across diplomacy, trade, industry, technology and security cooperation, Kuo said there is no evidence that the Takaichi administration or the Japanese government has changed its fundamental policy toward Taiwan.

Japan’s security cooperation with Taiwan continues to follow the direction established under former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s 2022 National Security Strategy and related security documents, including stronger military deployments in Okinawa and the southwestern islands, Kuo said. Those deployments are closely connected to Taiwan Strait security, and there are no signs of a policy reversal.

Kuo added that the Takaichi administration has begun reassessing Japan’s security policy and is expected to revise and release new security-related documents by the end of this year, earlier than previously scheduled.

Japan is redefining its security environment, threats and response strategies, he said. 

Kuo noted that Taiwan may be seen as an important security partner in this process, and its role, along with the direction of Taiwan-Japan security cooperation, could become clearer once the new documents are released.

China’s pressure on Japan in diplomatic, economic, technological and military spheres may not weaken Taiwan-Japan cooperation, Kuo said. Instead, it could prompt Japan to assess China-related risks more concretely and accelerate the development of Taiwan-Japan security cooperation.

Security cooperation

Shen said China views the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea as important strategic spaces. If Beijing increases military pressure in any of these areas, security partners including the United States, Japan and the Philippines are likely to strengthen coordination and cooperation, Shen added.

Taiwan and Japan lack a formal defense agreement and crisis-management mechanism, which places significant constraints on bilateral security cooperation, Shen said. 

However, Shen noted, if the United States leads security cooperation along the first island chain, there remains room for further development in Taiwan-Japan interaction.

The US is now encouraging countries along the first island chain to strengthen their self-defense capabilities and regional coordination while maintaining a low profile on sensitive issues, Shen said.