Taiwan report says PLA lacks invasion capacity now, but experts warn 2030 looms

Taiwan’s recent release of its 2026 Report on China’s Military Power has drawn attention its assessment that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still lacks sufficient capability to mount a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Experts said the assessment reflects current conditions, while warning that the period from 2030 to 2035 could be pivotal.

The report

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) released its 2026 Report on China’s Military Power on Aug. 31, saying Beijing continues to advance military modernization amid heightened regional security tensions while simultaneously increasing military pressure on Taiwan and preparing its forces for potential conflict.

The report said Beijing is strengthening its overall military power through civil-military integration, national defense mobilization and military reforms, and is continuing to develop nuclear weapons, missiles, naval and air forces, space capabilities, cyber and electronic warfare, and information operations to improve long-range power projection, joint operations and its ability to influence regional developments.

Regarding threats to Taiwan, the report said the PLA still lacks adequate capabilities for an amphibious invasion, including the ability to conduct multi-axis landings, maintain air and sea control, and sustain the subsequent delivery of troops and supplies.

However, the report noted that China is continuing to improve its ability to rapidly shift from peacetime exercises to crisis or combat operations through realistic training, cross-service coordination and the development of new weapons.

The report said China's actions now extend beyond conventional military intimidation, combining gray-zone coercion, air and naval operations, cognitive warfare and lawfare to gradually compress Taiwan's warning time and response space.

The report highlighted the possibility that China could employ “joint blockade-control operations,” combining naval and air forces, the China Coast Guard and other non-military assets to pressure Taiwan’s surrounding sea and air routes, ports and external links. 

Strategic signals

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told Taiwan Current News that this year’s report reflects Beijing’s gradual expansion of its claims and control over waters surrounding Taiwan.

Compared with last year's report, Su said, the report places substantially greater emphasis on joint blockade-control operations and gray-zone activities. China has steadily increased the frequency of such operations in recent years, he said, expanding a model of normalized law-enforcement activity around Kinmen to Dongsha Island and waters east of Taiwan.

Beijing's intention, Su said, is to gradually bring surrounding waters under its claimed jurisdiction by using coast guard forces, which draw less international alarm and are more easily framed as law enforcement, to create faits accomplis through a "salami-slicing" approach.

Su said Beijing’s strategic objectives should not be understood solely through the lens of cross-strait unification or independence. 

China’s deeper objective is to transform itself from a traditionally land-based power into a maritime power, he said, and Taiwan occupies a crucial sea and air transportation node in the western Pacific, giving it importance in China’s broader maritime strategy and geopolitical planning beyond its technology industry.

2030

Chieh Chung (揭仲), a strategic scholar at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, said the MND’s assessment that the PLA still lacks sufficient amphibious invasion capability is consistent with current conditions.

However, Chieh told TCN that the report also reveals a series of PLA efforts to accelerate preparations for a potential use of force against Taiwan. He said many of these programs could be completed between 2030 and 2035.

In its sections on weapons procurement and military training, Chieh said, the report shows important signs that the PLA is transforming its approach to joint island-landing operations. It cites the PLA Army’s efforts to upgrade the Z-20 helicopter and develop unmanned transport helicopters, as well as new airborne infantry fighting vehicles, transport vehicles and mortar carrier vehicles.

The report also notes that PLA Army aviation helicopter units have practiced refueling and rearming from maritime platforms. Chieh said these developments are closely linked to a PLA concept under which the first wave of attacking troops would use transport aircraft and helicopters to bypass Taiwan’s coastal defenses and enter the island’s interior directly.

The report said that the PLA Navy plans to build additional self-elevating amphibious landing barges and bridge-type amphibious landing craft. Chieh said these platforms are intended to address the limited cross-strait capability of China’s existing over-the-shore unloading systems and their difficulty operating in the Taiwan Strait’s sea conditions.

Even if Taiwanese ports were damaged or unavailable during a conflict, such equipment could help subsequent landing echelons and supplies reach shore more quickly, making it a key capability for sustaining joint island-landing operations, he said.

Chieh added that this year’s report includes new content related to island-landing operations in supporting fields such as military space, cyberspace, information support and joint logistics.

Taiwan’s defense improvements remain decisive

Su agreed that the PLA could gradually complete key amphibious capabilities between 2030 and 2035, but said the timetable is not fixed and will depend on changes in the relative military capabilities of both sides.

Taiwan's most important recent changes go beyond hardware acquisitions such as M1A2 Abrams tanks, Su said, extending to military innovation, adjustments to operational concepts, changes in force structure and organization, and stronger reserve capabilities.

Through asymmetric assets such as drones, anti-ship missiles and sea mines, Taiwan is continuing to strengthen its “porcupine” defense network, he said.

“If our defense capability is inadequate, the other side may believe that the opportunity cannot be missed,” Su said. “But if our defense capability continues to improve, it may delay its actions.”

Strengthening Taiwan’s deterrence and self-defense capabilities can itself influence Beijing’s calculation of when to use force, he added.

Indicators to watch

Su said several indicators can help assess the PLA’s progress in developing amphibious invasion capabilities.

The key question is not simply the number of amphibious ships China possesses, he said, but whether it can effectively land large quantities of heavy equipment, with China currently focused on building combat vessels, including continued development of the Type 004 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

China’s regular amphibious landing fleet, including Type 071, Type 072 and Type 075 vessels, totals roughly 80 ships, Su said, but its capacity to project heavy equipment ashore remains limited.

If China completes a surface combat fleet of sufficient scale, it could then accelerate construction of amphibious landing ships to bolster its ability to invade Taiwan, he said. That would be an important indicator to monitor.

Beijing could also build new sea-land bases around Fujian and combine helicopter-borne assaults with conventional amphibious landings to develop “three-dimensional landing” capabilities, Su said.

Su indicated that light infantry deployed by helicopter, parachute or amphibious landing cannot sustain combat or advance for long without armored vehicles, artillery and other heavy equipment, making the ability to continuously move such equipment ashore the most important indicator of a PLA landing operation's success.

China is also attempting to develop special offshore pier systems, Su said. These would involve positioning vessels resembling offshore oil platforms near beaches, stabilizing them with support legs and creating temporary piers where commercial ships could dock and unload.

However, Su cautioned against overstating the value of such floating or temporary pier systems, since PLA logistical nodes could be vulnerable to Taiwanese firepower and easily destroyed if forces fail to secure a beachhead and advance inland.