Experts say Xi’s new Taiwan wording may foreshadow more gray-zone operations

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) recent shift in language on Taiwan has drawn attention, but some US officials assess that the likelihood of a Chinese invasion on Taiwan in 2027 remains low. Taiwanese experts say the prospect of a near-term large-scale invasion appears to be declining, even as Beijing may intensify gray-zone pressure.

Xi’s wording and US assessment

Speaking at a reception on Sept. 30 marking the People's Republic of China’s 77th National Day, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for deeper cross-strait cooperation while vowing to firmly combat "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and oppose external interference, China’s state media People’s Daily reported. 

Using stronger wording at this year’s reception, Xi vowed Beijing would “firmly combat” Taiwan independence forces, stiffening his language at the 2025 National Day reception, which called to “resolutely oppose” separatist moves.

US officials have said Xi previously directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to develop the capability to seize Taiwan by force by 2027, the centenary of the PLA’s founding.

Current and former US officials assessed that a large-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 is increasingly unlikely, Reuters reported. According to the report, Beijing is closely watching Taiwan’s 2028 presidential race, where some Chinese officials hope an election outcome yields a government more receptive to dialogue and eventual political unification.

Responding to questions on Oct. 1, Presidential Office spokesperson Kuo Ya-hui (郭雅慧) declared that three decades of Chinese military intimidation have failed to sway the public since Taiwan's first direct presidential vote in 1996, emphasizing that the island "will not abandon its commitment to democracy and freedom because of any military threat."

The 2027 window may be closing

Juichou Richard Hu (胡瑞舟), a retired major general and deputy director of the Taiwan Center for Security Studies, told TCN that the widely discussed “Davidson window” — a predicted timeframe for potential Chinese military action around 2027 — may be drawing to a close.

The phrase originates from 2021 congressional testimony by then-US Indo-Pacific commander Adm. Philip Davidson, who warned that China was rapidly matching US capabilities and could target Taiwan by 2027.

While the likelihood of a near-term, large-scale PLA assault appears to be waning, Hu noted that cross-strait military threats remain very real.

“Beijing’s intent and preparations to use force against Taiwan still cannot be ignored,” Hu said.

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, also told TCN that the likelihood of China directly using force against Taiwan before the end of 2028 remains low.

Threat timelines often mirror political calendars, including Xi’s potential fourth term and presidential elections in both Taipei and Washington, Su explained.

However, he cautioned that 2028 is not an automatic danger point, noting that divergent election cycles and significant strategic and military risks continue to factor into Beijing’s calculus.

Beijing’s calculations

The threat of war across the Taiwan Strait is dynamic and cannot be fixed to a single target year, Hu said, explaining that any Chinese action hinges on Beijing's political intent, capabilities, and unexpected opportunities. 

While large-scale amphibious mobilizations remain difficult to conceal, Hu said that Taiwan and its international partners must continually sharpen intelligence gathering, risk analysis, and early-warning systems.

Su warned against treating potential conflict timelines as firm predictions, arguing that speculation cannot foresee when Beijing might act or how Washington would intervene. Instead, he said, such milestones should be viewed as broad assessments of political conditions, calculated risks, and the prevailing balance of power.

Hu noted that any Chinese invasion involves complex political and economic stakes beyond the battlefield, requiring Beijing to consider potential blows to its "national rejuvenation" goals, domestic economic resilience, and the immense challenge of post-conflict governance.

Because a failed invasion could shatter the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and unravel Xi Jinping’s authority, Su noted, Beijing's primary concern is not just the cost of war, but whether it can ensure a quick and certain victory.

“If these conditions are not met, China is unlikely to readily choose large-scale military action,” Su said.

A tougher message from Xi

Hu noted that while Xi’s sharpened rhetoric reflects growing confidence and a harder line toward Taiwan, it does not necessarily signal a strategic pivot, emphasizing that observers should focus instead on Beijing's concrete actions.

Su argued the harsher language primarily serves as psychological warfare, intended to push PLA war preparedness and ramp up diplomatic and legal pressure on Taipei.

The next window?

If the Democratic Progressive Party retains power in Taiwan’s 2028 presidential race, the window from spring 2028 through 2032 warrants close scrutiny, Hu said. 

With Xi widely expected to secure a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027, cross-strait conflict risks could rise if Beijing concludes that non-military coercion has hit a dead end and Xi demands tangible progress on unification, Hu added.

Hu clarified that the assessment is not a forecast of inevitable conflict, but a call for Taiwan to take cross-strait risks seriously and balance robust deterrence with active measures to avoid war.

Su offered a different view, saying that while Beijing will make political judgments based on Taiwan’s election results and changes in governing parties, those factors are not the most decisive determinants of whether China uses force.

“What truly matters is still the Chinese leadership’s assessment of its chances of success and the overall balance of power across the Taiwan Strait,” Su said.

Gray-zone pressure likely to intensify

Although the likelihood of Beijing launching a near-term invasion appears low, both Hu and Su said China is likely to intensify gray-zone operations against Taiwan.

China’s gray-zone activities are poised to become more frequent and assertive as Beijing looks to capitalize on political openings in Taiwan, Hu said. 

In pursuit of what it sees as a "period of strategic opportunity," he added, Beijing is likely to steadily escalate military, diplomatic, and psychological pressure without necessarily launching an immediate war.

Su said Beijing could move from what he described as “medium-gray” to “deep-gray” operations. The PLA, China Coast Guard and other non-military forces may apply pressure around Taiwan with greater frequency, gradually changing the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s response

Su urged Taiwan to prioritize military deterrence while bolstering the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) to resist mounting gray-zone coercion. 

Arguing that current CGA resources are insufficient to match the China Coast Guard, Su recommended boosting the agency's funding, commissioning more ships, improving crew conditions, and establishing a dedicated coast guard aviation branch.

Hu called for a dual-track approach that pairs cross-strait dialogue with heightened vigilance, warning that Beijing’s long-term goal of taking Taiwan remains a “Sword of Damocles” over the island’s future. 

Noting that peace cannot rely on goodwill alone, he argued that Taiwan must strengthen defense preparedness, public mobilization, and societal resilience to ensure its security.