Takaichi’s history remarks aim to smooth the path to a meeting with Xi, Taiwanese expert says

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that her Cabinet would uphold the position expressed in the Murayama Statement. A Taiwanese expert said the remark was a conciliatory signal to Beijing as Tokyo seeks a meeting between Takaichi and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in November.

Murayama Statement

Asked about her views on history at a House of Councillors Budget Committee meeting on Oct. 16, Takaichi said that, as stated in the 70th-anniversary statement marking the end of World War II, the positions of successive Japanese Cabinets would remain unchanged under her administration.

She said this included the 1995 Murayama Statement, issued on Aug. 15 that year by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. 

The statement was the first in which the Japanese government officially acknowledged that Japan’s wartime aggression and colonial rule caused great damage and suffering in Asian countries, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.

A conciliatory signal?

This year’s APEC summit will be held in Shenzhen, China, on Nov. 18–19. Whether Xi and Takaichi will meet during the summit has drawn attention.

Takaichi confirmed plans to attend the China-hosted APEC leaders' summit pending Diet clearance, signaling a readiness to engage Beijing in person despite deeply strained bilateral ties.

Kuo Yu-jen (郭育仁), director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University, told TCN that Japan was working to arrange a meeting between the two leaders. Takaichi’s pledge to uphold the Murayama Statement ahead of APEC, he said, was a gesture of goodwill toward Beijing.

Given Beijing’s recent posture, a formal bilateral meeting remains improbable, Kuo said, suggesting that any encounter would likely be choreographed as a "chance meeting" in the corridors. 

Should no interaction take place at all, he said, it would signal that already strained Tokyo-Beijing relations are continuing to deteriorate.

A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency

In November 2025, Takaichi told Japan’s House of Representatives that a Chinese armed assault on Taiwan—such as a naval blockade enforced with military force—could be deemed a "survival-threatening situation" under Japanese security laws. Such a determination, she noted, could legally permit the Self-Defense Forces to exercise limited collective self-defense, provided other legal requirements were met.

Beijing responded with retaliatory measures, cooling cultural exchanges, dampening outbound tourism to Japan, re-imposing a ban on Japanese seafood, and restricting exports of dual-use goods to Japanese military users and for military uses, including uses that contribute to Japan’s military capabilities. China’s dual-use control list covers roughly 1,100 items, including critical minerals such as rare earths, gallium, and germanium.

Kuo said Takaichi’s commitment to the Murayama Statement did not mean she was retracting her “Taiwan contingency, Japan contingency” remarks, adding that the two issues were unrelated.

Pointing to enduring structural rifts over history, the disputed Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, and cross-strait issues, Kuo noted that Takaichi previously stated in parliament that Tokyo refrains from commenting on Taiwan's status under international law because Japan has renounced sovereignty over the island.

Kuo said the remarks indirectly touched on the “undetermined status of Taiwan” theory, which Beijing opposes, but should not be conflated with Takaichi’s earlier comments about a Taiwan contingency.

Xi-Takaichi meeting could signal easing tensions

Kuo said a meeting between Xi and Takaichi at APEC was unlikely, but that Beijing also had an interest in easing tensions with Tokyo amid the current international environment.

Kuo pointed out that, ahead of Japan’s year-end revisions to its National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program, the Japan Innovation Party has called for the blueprints to endorse nuclear-powered submarines and create an exception to Tokyo's Three Non-Nuclear Principles to permit US nuclear-armed assets entry during contingencies.

Pointing out that the APEC summit coincides with coalition-level preparations to deliver defense recommendations to Takaichi, Kuo noted that Tokyo could deploy flexible terminology like "consider" in the revised security documents to retain strategic room for maneuver.

While such defense debates risk antagonizing Beijing, they could paradoxically create openings for renewed bilateral dialogue, Kuo argued. Tokyo’s public discourse on nuclear-powered submarines and potential exemptions to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles may function as a calculated form of strategic signaling toward China, he added.

Beyond the defense document updates, Kuo noted, Takaichi has set her sights on a major constitutional overhaul next year. The four-point reform agenda targets enshrining the legal status of the Self-Defense Forces in pacifist Article 9, creating executive emergency authorities during national crises, ending merged House of Councillors constituencies to ensure representation for each prefecture, and improving educational access.

Kuo said China would not want Japan to revise Article 9 and might therefore seek to coordinate with Tokyo on the matter. 

Japan-Taiwan security cooperation

Regardless of whether Tokyo and Beijing break the ice on the sidelines of APEC, the direct military threat China poses to Japan remains fundamentally unaltered, Kuo said. 

Looking ahead, he predicted that Japan’s updated security documents, due by year-end, will define its stance on security cooperation with Taiwan with unprecedented clarity.

Even if Japan-China relations ease temporarily, Kuo said, Takaichi is unlikely to change her policy toward Taiwan and remains strongly inclined to advance security cooperation with the island.

Taiwan should proceed cautiously

Kuo said a substantive improvement in Japan-China relations would be difficult under Takaichi’s administration.

Since November last year, he said, China has restricted group travel to Japan and rare-earth supplies, sought to court Japanese opposition parties and factions outside the mainstream of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and criticized Takaichi in international forums, putting pressure on her.

Despite Takaichi’s push to deepen economic, technological, and defense alignment with Taiwan, Kuo noted she remains constrained at home by pushback from career diplomats, business interests, opposition parties, and rival ruling-party factions.

Takaichi remains exceedingly unlikely to walk back her statements regarding a Taiwan contingency, Kuo noted. Given the resulting pressure from Beijing and domestic critics, cultivating a close, steadfast rapport with US President Donald Trump has become paramount to underwriting her security agenda, Kuo added.

Kuo urged Taipei to recognize the practical constraints shaping Japan’s cross-strait policy, noting that bilateral cooperation has traditionally advanced most effectively out of the public eye. 

Taiwan should respect Tokyo’s appetite for discretion rather than pressing for high-profile diplomatic milestones, allowing practical partnerships to develop steadily beneath the political radar, Kuo added.