Taiwan experts see strategic signals in new US Army guidance

New US Army guidance points to opportunities for closer military cooperation with Taiwan, local defense analysts say, though they differ on what it signals about possible US intervention. 

The document

On Oct. 7, the US Army released How the Army Fights, a 46-page operational guidance document developed under Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Christopher LaNeve.

Identifying China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a "pacing threat" capable of disrupting reinforcements from the continental US, the guidance emphasizes forward-stationed assets and prepositioned stockpiles along the First Island Chain to enable forces to act from the first day of a conflict.

On Oct. 21, South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo reported that the guidance is intended to ensure US forces stationed in the region can enter combat from the first day of a conflict in places such as the Taiwan Strait and fight to win.

The document has since been covered by several Taiwanese media outlets, including United Daily News, FTV News and Public Television Service.

What the guidance means 

Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told TCN that the new US Army document is better described as an “operational concept” than as military doctrine already implemented at the unit level.

Shen noted that the framework outlines how forces should be positioned and prepared in the Indo-Pacific rather than detailing brigade- or battalion-level tactics.

Shen clarified that the document’s call for readiness from the first day of a conflict does not imply US ground troops would deploy directly to Taiwan at its outset, but instead reflects a requirement for US units to be ready to fight across the broader region.

The document reflects evolving US Army thinking on preparing for contingencies across the Taiwan Strait and the broader Western Pacific, Shen observed. Rather than fielding heavy armor formations such as main battle tanks, that posture is expected to prioritize dispersed deployments ahead of conflict, regional coordination and long-range precision strikes using systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).

Strategic signals

Ma Chun-wei (馬準威), an assistant professor of strategic studies at Tamkang University, told TCN that the guidance signals a lasting US military presence along the First Island Chain and suggests that Washington would likely intervene if military conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait.

“The signal is very, very clear,” Ma said. “On preventing China from invading Taiwan, I think the US military may not have spoken this plainly in a very long time — perhaps ever.”

Ma interpreted the document as a rejection of US abandonment of Taiwan, saying that deterring a Chinese invasion remains the prevailing view within the US government and military. 

Ma added that the approach outlined in the document strengthens allies’ resolve and helps deter Beijing from altering the cross-strait status quo or attempting to breach and control the First Island Chain.

Shen offered a more cautious assessment, saying that while the document falls short of a public pledge to deploy US Army forces alongside Taiwan, it signals that the service is reassessing its potential role in a cross-strait conflict.

Shen noted that while earlier US planning to counter systems that restrict military access emphasized the Air-Sea Battle concept, giving ground forces a smaller role, the US Army is now positioning itself for First Island Chain contingencies, with potential deployments involving US forces in South Korea and the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division, which recently took part in exercises in Palawan.

The shift reflects a reassessment of the Army’s role in Indo-Pacific operations and signals that the US is giving the Army greater emphasis in its preparations for regional conflict, Shen said.

Taiwan-US cooperation

Shen noted that Washington must coordinate regional forces across neighboring countries in advance, reflecting a shared view of the threat with Taipei and scope for closer operational cooperation.

Should deterrence fail and a cross-strait conflict escalate into an amphibious invasion, island defense operations, or protracted ground combat, land forces would become pivotal, Shen noted. He said the US military therefore needs joint training for a range of scenarios, beyond an initial maritime confrontation. 

Ma said Washington would not publish such guidance without detailed operational plans to support it. He said those plans remain classified and almost certainly include Taiwan. 

Ma said that US arms sales to Taiwan in recent years reflect Washington’s efforts to steer Taipei toward weapons that support Taiwan’s role in US defense planning.

Ma said that if US operational plans incorporate Adm. Samuel Paparo’s "Hellscape" concept, uncrewed systems will be crucial, consistent with Washington's push for Taiwan to strengthen its coastal defenses against amphibious landings.

"US policy is clear: if the PLA has not landed, the United States will help," Ma said, describing his assessment of US policy.

"If it has already landed, US forces may not necessarily come in and fight alongside Taiwan, but they may provide assistance. The planning is mainly focused on the first stage: preventing a landing in the first place."

Taiwan’s preparations

Shen noted that bilateral defense exchanges already include US personnel observing Taiwan's Han Kuang exercises and ground-operation planning. He identified several areas for closer cooperation. 

Operational planning and tactics are a priority, requiring Taiwan and the US to coordinate operations across military domains and agree on responsibility for targets, Shen noted. He said that Taiwan’s defense planners must prepare both for independent operations and for coordinated strikes with US forces.

Shen identified compatible communications systems and data links as essential, noting that US weapons systems must connect with Taiwan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems to support effective joint operations.

Shen identified equipment and logistics as another core priority, emphasizing that Taiwan’s military must be ready to quickly integrate and use incoming US weapons, including attack helicopters and HIMARS, as well as emergency munitions shipments.

Cooperation could extend to joint operations across military services, requiring Taiwan’s Army to communicate in real time with US air, naval and ground forces, Shen observed. In high-intensity conflict, Taiwanese ground commanders would need to communicate directly with US forces, receive intelligence from naval and air units and request long-range fire support, he said. 

“These are all areas where deeper cooperation requires early exercises and preparation,” Shen said.