Taiwan Strait risks manageable but more Chinese pressure expected after CCP’s Fifth Plenum, experts say

Taiwanese experts said that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 20th Central Committee Fifth Plenum marks deeper power consolidation paving the way for Xi Jinping’s (習近平) potential fourth term as party leader in 2027, noting that while cross-strait friction remains broadly containable, Taipei faces mounting military and gray-zone operational pressure.

The Fifth Plenum

Following the close of its Fifth Plenum on Thursday (Oct. 29), the CCP Central Committee adopted a major decision reinforcing "full and strict party governance" while formally elevating Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin (張升民) to the Politburo.

Unlike the Fourth Plenum communiqué, this one did not include political slogans such as the “Two Establishes,” the “Four Consciousnesses,” the “Four Confidences” and the “Two Safeguards,” which had featured prominently in the past.

Underscoring an unusually low turnout, combined attendance fell to 279 members and alternates, down 36 from the Fourth Plenum, accounting for just 74 percent of the members and alternates elected at the 20th Party Congress in 2022.

In addition to scheduling the 21st Party Congress in Beijing for the second half of 2027, the plenum confirmed the party expulsions of 33 senior party, state, and military officials, notably including Ma Xingrui (馬興瑞), Zhang Youxia (張又俠), and Liu Zhenli (劉振立).

Consolidating Xi’s leadership

Kuo Yu-jen (郭育仁), director of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University, argued that while the plenum unequivocally demonstrates Xi’s expanding power consolidation, observers must critically examine whether this total control over the party, government, and military is an operational means or an end in itself.

Speaking at a forum, Kuo said that while centralizing control as an end in itself is less alarming, viewing Xi's power consolidation as a means to achieve broader, undisclosed ambitions makes the end goal "very worrying."

Tung Li-wen (董立文), executive director of the Asia-Pacific Peace Research Foundation, noted that the Fifth Plenum pointed to Xi Jinping’s trajectory toward a fourth term as party leader in 2027, with the earlier appointment of 70-year-old Cai Qi (蔡奇) as president of the Central Party School highlighting, in Tung’s view, a deliberate refusal to groom a successor.

Tung argued that pursuing another leadership term will obligate Xi Jinping to address core legitimacy questions before the party and public, including the strategic rationale for extending his tenure, the unresolved succession risks, and his policy blueprint for a renewed mandate.

Tightening control at home, asserting China’s claims abroad

Kuo told TCN that the period leading up to next year's 21st Party Congress will amount to a year of "quasi-martial law" in China, during which formal institutional and legal norms are likely to be circumvented in favor of personalized authoritarian rule.

Kuo stated that Beijing could pursue a dual strategy of domestic stability enforcement and external assertiveness, using force to deter protests like the White Paper movement at home while refusing to tolerate international incidents that challenge its prestige, such as then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan.

Kuo said that China is likely to turn markedly more hostile over the next year across its maritime periphery, applying coordinated air and naval pressure on Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines from the East China Sea through the South China Sea.

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a professor in the Department of Political Science at National Cheng Kung University, offered a similar assessment. He told TCN that Xi remains resolutely hawkish across Chinese foreign policy, explaining that Beijing’s pursuit of a "stable" external perimeter is aimed not at upholding the status quo, but at restructuring the regional order to its own advantage.

Wang noted that Beijing is actively monitoring political trajectories across Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, demanding that Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi retract comments linking Taiwan's security to Japan's, while assessing Taiwan's legislative dynamics and municipal shifts as a benchmark for its influence ahead of the 2028 elections.

On the Philippines and the South China Sea, Wang said Beijing would continue to keep close strategic and tactical watch, and pressure was unlikely to ease.

The Taiwan Strait

Wang said key Taiwan policy decisions are now concentrated in Xi’s hands rather than the Taiwan Affairs Office, leaving subordinate organs to implement directives while incentivizing frontline cadres to exploit sensitive disputes as vehicles to demonstrate political loyalty.

For Chinese officials, Wang added, Taiwan is no longer the only issue through which they can demonstrate political loyalty; other political issues can serve the same purpose.

Kuo highlighted the conspicuous absence of named, large-scale encirclement drills around Taiwan so far in 2026, noting that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) may pivot toward conducting unannounced operational deployments that function as disguised military exercises in practice.

Kuo identified the PLA’s centenary on Aug. 1, 2027, as a key deadline for Xi Jinping to overhaul a damaged military command structure, projecting that the relatively quiet aircraft carriers Shandong and Fujian are likely preparing for major appearances alongside the operational Liaoning ahead of the anniversary.

Kuo said that as weather improves from late April or May 2027, China could deploy substantial forces around Taiwan and in the western Pacific, potentially involving two or even three aircraft carriers.

China’s diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan is continuing to increase, Kuo said, and could peak between the Fifth Plenum and next year’s 21st Party Congress, with many military operations likely to take place during that period.

Wang agreed that large-scale exercises of the kind seen in the past might not occur between now and next year. Instead, he said, Beijing could conduct military operations around the Taiwan Strait “without calling them exercises.”

“Such operations would place greater pressure on Taiwan’s national security defenses,” Wang said.

Risks remain manageable

Chang Wu-ueh (張五岳), chief adviser of Tamkang University’s Center for Cross-Strait Relations, assessed that near-term cross-strait risks remain contained thanks to open US-China dialogue ahead of the Shenzhen Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and Group of 20 (G20) meetings, though the trajectory will be determined by ongoing trilateral interactions between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.

Wang noted that while Xi might attempt to shape Taiwan policy through Washington, the multilateral framework of upcoming APEC and G20 forums complicates Beijing's ability to exert direct, concentrated pressure over Taiwan compared to a dedicated bilateral summit in Washington.

Wang said that if Beijing was unable to exert effective pressure during prior Trump-Xi bilaterals, securing concrete outcomes on Taiwan at a multilateral summit would be difficult, remarking that "if the issue is mentioned at all, that would already be something."

Chang said the US midterm elections could pose a potential challenge for cross-strait relations. 

Chang noted that under a scenario where Democrats gain control of both chambers of Congress, Beijing would evaluate strategic competition with Washington and Taipei through four primary flashpoints, including arms transfers, President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) US transits, high-level visits to Taiwan, and pro-Taiwan congressional legislation.

Chang noted that the conclusion of Taiwan’s local elections will quickly give way to the 2028 presidential campaign, where cross-strait issues and domestic political shifts will become inescapable cross-party concerns against the backdrop of the PLA’s centenary and the CCP’s 21st Party Congress in 2027.

Looking toward 2027

The 21st Party Congress in 2027 will set the stage for the selection of the party’s next leadership, while Taiwan is due to hold its presidential election in early 2028. 

Wang argued that Beijing’s institutional groundwork from the Fifth Plenum through the 2027–2028 transition could yield strategic leverage, noting that consolidating domestic control would afford Xi broader operational leeway to influence Taiwan’s upcoming elections.

Wang said that Taiwan's central peril in 2027–2028 is not an acute military invasion along the "Davidson window" timeline, but rather the most aggressive phase of political infiltration and election interference to date once Xi cements his hold on power.