Taiwan’s Papua New Guinea office closure highlights Beijing’s push to shrink its global space

Taiwan has decided to close its representative office in Papua New Guinea and withdraw its staff, a development that underscores Beijing's unrelenting squeeze on Taipei's international space and demands a broader counterstrategy, a Taiwanese expert said.

Office closure

The Papua New Guinea government renewed its demand that Taiwan close its representative office in Port Moresby. Papua New Guinea’s foreign affairs department said on Friday (Nov. 6) that it had given two officials seven days to leave and that a third would stay to wind down the office.

Taiwan announced the closure of its Papua New Guinea office and the withdrawal of all personnel on Friday (Nov. 6) in a foreign ministry statement, citing national dignity and diplomatic autonomy while warning the international community against Beijing’s expanding political footprint.

Taiwan has halted spot purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Papua New Guinea, after originally planning to buy roughly 500,000 metric tons in the first half of 2026, and has ruled out new spot contracts with the Pacific nation, the foreign ministry said.

In comments reported Sunday (Nov. 8), the US State Department expressed concern over Papua New Guinea’s demand that Taiwan close its office, describing it as part of a Beijing intimidation campaign that “undermines the sovereign decisions of countries choosing to partner with Taiwan and threatens international peace and prosperity.”

Beijing’s pressure

Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng (邱垂正) said on Saturday (Nov. 7) that Beijing was making every effort to obstruct and restrict Taiwan’s diplomatic space. “We will not retreat,” he said, adding that Taiwan would not give up its participation in the international community or important diplomatic events.

Chiu said the government had anticipated that Beijing would use its interpretation of the “One China” principle to further constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space, including by pressing countries in the Global South that support Beijing to close Taiwan’s representative offices.

Sun Kuo-hsiang (孫國祥), a professor in the Department of International Affairs and Business at Nanhua University, told TCN that the decision to close the mission exposes the vulnerabilities of Taiwan's unofficial diplomacy, underscoring Beijing’s expanding toolkit of economic incentives and diplomatic pressure used to isolate the island.

Papua New Guinea says its decision is consistent with its own One China policy, Sun said, while Taiwan and the United States have raised concerns about broader Chinese pressure. Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape said in July that outside pressure had played no role in his government’s reaffirmation of that policy.

The episode also shows that economic cooperation and development assistance do not necessarily ensure diplomatic security, especially when smaller countries must balance competing geopolitical and economic interests, he added.

LNG and bilateral ties

In the short term, closing the office and ending technical cooperation and aid programs could weaken relations between Taiwan and Papua New Guinea and reduce Taiwan’s influence in the South Pacific, Sun said.

The suspension of spot LNG purchases and decision not to sign new spot contracts could also affect Papua New Guinea’s export revenues and foreign exchange earnings. Taiwan has accounted for about one-third of the country’s LNG exports, Sun said.

Taiwan should consider alternative suppliers following the decision to stop spot buying LNG from Papua New Guinea, he added. Diversifying suppliers could help reduce energy security risks, though procurement costs and contract terms would need careful management. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it had already identified alternative sources.

What to watch

Sun said signs that Beijing is intensifying its diplomatic pressure on Taiwan would include host-nation restrictions on informal missions and pressure on Taipei's remaining Pacific partners. He also pointed to the scale of Chinese security investments and the deterrence offered by Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra.

A crucial test for Taiwan will be its ability to diversify trade networks and broaden meaningful international participation despite its limited formal diplomatic recognition, according to Sun. 

The primary struggle, he noted, goes beyond merely keeping overseas offices open to sustaining Taiwan's strategic maneuverability, economic resilience, and global access in an era of escalating US–China friction.

A broader response

Sun said Taiwan should combine diplomatic resolve with economic pragmatism, ensuring that its response to Beijing’s pressure does not undermine its own energy security or commercial interests.

Taiwan should work with the US, Australia, Japan and other like-minded partners to coordinate diplomatically, diversify LNG supplies and build more resilient energy supply chains, he said.

While halting Papua New Guinean LNG spot purchases sends a targeted economic signal, Taiwan must avoid broader trade sanctions that could inflate energy costs or disrupt private commerce, Sun noted, advising officials to closely monitor the long-term price competitiveness of replacement supplies.

To buffer against geopolitical vulnerabilities without burning commercial bridges, Sun recommended Taiwan decouple official aid from bilateral trade while shoring up energy resilience through larger strategic stockpiles and diversified long-term gas supply deals.

Taiwan’s response, Sun said, should impose diplomatic costs while avoiding disproportionate costs to its own economy.