Chinese naval and coast guard presence around Taiwan points to shift in pressure tactics

The reported presence of more than 100 Chinese naval and coast guard vessels across the western Pacific has raised concerns that China may be conducting an unannounced blockade drill targeting Taiwan. Taiwanese security experts urged faster upgrades to Taipei’s early-warning networks and Coast Guard capabilities.

Chinese military activity

Wu Jau-shieh (吳釗燮), secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, said in a Nov. 3 social media post that more than 100 Chinese navy and coast guard vessels were operating in the western Pacific.

The Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute, two Washington-based think tanks, stated in a Nov. 6 report on cross-strait developments that China might be conducting a large-scale, unannounced military exercise simulating the isolation of Taiwan. The report said the activity could also undermine public confidence in the island’s ability to defend itself.

Defense Minister Koo Li-hsiung (顧立雄) told reporters on Nov. 10 that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Liaoning aircraft carrier group and other Chinese naval forces had recently conducted area-denial exercises in the western Pacific. He said the military intimidation was intended to undermine peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. 

He said the Defense Ministry was closely monitoring the activities and would respond appropriately.

A shift in pressure tactics

Chen Kuan-ting (陳冠廷), a member of the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, said China’s military pressure on Taiwan was undergoing a structural shift. 

A sharp drop in Chinese military flights, alongside relatively steady naval activity and mounting coast guard patrols, signals Beijing’s intent to normalize persistent maritime pressure and quietly alter the cross-strait balance, Chen added.

Chinese military aircraft sorties around Taiwan plunged 51.1% to 1,763 by mid-August compared to the same period last year, while Chinese government vessel detections surged nearly 150% to 457, Chen said. He described the figures as evidence of a shift toward greater use of government vessels to pressure Taiwan. 

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, offered a similar assessment. 

He told TCN that Beijing’s shift to conducting exercises without announcing them could reduce international backlash while still demonstrating its ability to blockade Taiwan. Recent operations have also involved multiple theater commands, central and local governments, and various government agencies, reflecting a whole-of-government mobilization effort, he said.

By pooling assets from the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands with vessels from government ministries and municipal maritime militias, Beijing tested its ability to mobilize forces across agencies and levels of government, Su said.

Chen said while aerial sorties function primarily as episodic shows of force, China's sustained naval and coast guard patrols help normalize Chinese law enforcement activity at sea and gradually extend Beijing’s jurisdictional claims.

Joint combat readiness patrols

Chieh Chung (揭仲), an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, offered a different view of the PLA’s recent activity.

The vessel movements alone provide insufficient evidence of a coordinated rehearsal for an invasion of Taiwan, Chieh told TCN, suggesting the deployments may instead reflect separate, routine operations across long-established PLA training zones in the South China Sea and western Pacific.

China has about 300 to 400 naval vessels and 150 to 200 coast guard vessels of more than 1,000 tons, for a combined total of about 500 large vessels. If roughly one-third are at sea on duty at any given time, the presence of more than 100 naval and coast guard vessels in the open ocean is not unusual, Chieh said.

Large-scale military exercises targeting Taiwan, such as the "Joint Sword" drills, are typically ad hoc political responses to perceived red-line violations rather than recurring annual maneuvers, he said.

Large-scale Chinese military exercises are heavily publicized to maximize psychological intimidation rather than tactical utility, Chieh said, pointing to dispersed deployments near Taiwan's contiguous zone that prompt Taiwan to shadow Chinese vessels individually while leaving Chinese vessels vulnerable to coastal anti-ship missiles in real combat.

The PLA’s joint combat readiness patrols pose a greater threat to Taiwan than publicized military exercises, Chieh said, noting that the operations have become institutionalized on a predictable three-times-a-month cycle.

Citing a joint combat readiness patrol on Nov. 4, Chieh pointed to the surge of 49 Chinese military aircraft sorties detected near Taiwan in the 24 hours to 6 a.m. on Nov. 3. The Defense Ministry said 31 entered Taiwan’s central, southwestern and eastern air defense identification zones. Chieh assessed that the PLA likely conducted unannounced maneuvers across the strategic Bashi Channel.

Incremental pressure

Su said large-scale joint mobilization by the PLA against Taiwan was unlikely to become routine, but Beijing could coordinate the activities of the coast guard with research, administrative and other vessels depending on the circumstances.

The practice of not publicly announcing exercise code names could continue alongside routine carrier drills and military operations of varying scale, gradually signaling China’s ability to blockade Taiwan, he said.

Su described this as a refined “salami-slicing” strategy, in which small, incremental actions build pressure and may gradually become normalized in the eyes of outside observers.

How Taiwan should respond

Taiwan must closely examine how China conducts drills around the island to anticipate how Beijing might operate in wartime and identify early warning signs, such as unusual naval movements, Chieh said.

“Collecting this intelligence can help build an early-warning mechanism,” Chieh said. 

Taiwan should also examine which activities are carried out during the exercises and determine whether they are related to preparations for the use of force against Taiwan, he said.

Su said strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities and self-reliance should be the top priorities. 

Su called for Taipei to increase Coast Guard funding alongside military spending, saying budget shortfalls and a lack of fixed-wing surveillance aircraft limit maritime enforcement.

Improving Coast Guard capabilities and developing fixed-wing aircraft would help Taiwan monitor its surrounding waters and respond to infiltration by speedboats or rubber boats, Su said.

Taiwan also should coordinate its military and diplomatic efforts while deepening maritime ties with the US, Japan, and Canada, Su said, adding that stronger international support would depend on what Taiwan could contribute.

“China is continuing to send a signal that if necessary, it has the ability to blockade Taiwan. That broad direction will not change,” Su said. 

“For Taiwan to break a blockade, it needs sufficient capabilities. It cannot rely on diplomatic rhetoric about the importance of self-reliance; that would amount to all talk,” Su added.