Mainland China is eroding Taiwan’s defense capabilities through gray-zone tactics. (The Coast Guard Administration)

China goes full gray zone in bid to swallow Taiwan whole

China is expanding gray-zone tactics with a plan to internalize Taiwan.

On August 29, 2025, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) released the "2025 Report on the PLA’s Military Power." The report, which assessed the development of China's military and the threat it poses to Taiwan, concluded that China's gray-zone harassment will increasingly combine non-military measures with quasi-military pressure.

China's gray zone

The concept of the gray-zone conflict originates in Cold War-era strategic theory. It has regained prominence as China increasingly leverages non-kinetic means to assert influence and reshape norms.

In Western defense discourse, the gray zone encompasses coercive activities across the political, economic, military, legal, and informational spheres. It is conducted in the space between peace and full-scale war.

Chinese military and policy thinkers, however, rarely use the term gray zone to describe their activities. Instead, they refer to concepts codified in official doctrine, such as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).

Within China's strategic framework, MOOTW is viewed as a legitimate instrument to safeguard sovereignty, ensure national security, and promote developmental interests. MOOTW helps to portray China as a stabilizing force in regional and global affairs.

Professor Liu Fu-Kuo (劉復國), Director of the Taiwan Center for Security Studies (TCSS) at National Chengchi University, told TCN that China’s increasing reliance on gray-zone tactics reflects its rising comprehensive national power. 

Taiwan is target number one

Taiwan’s location at the heart of the First Island Chain makes it a natural focal point of China’s gray-zone efforts. The East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea form an ideal arena for Beijing’s low-cost, high-impact coercive strategies.

Professor Liu said that China’s maritime gray-zone strategy involves a layered enforcement model in which the China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia operate up front, while China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) provides backup from a distance. 

China’s maritime militia, rooted in its “People’s War” doctrine, plays a dual role—projecting sovereignty externally while maintaining domestic legitimacy. 

China's militia has been increasingly active since the beginning of Xi Jinping's presidency. Examples include incidents such as the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, where China and the Philippines disputed control over the area for weeks, and a 2016 incident when China Coast Guard vessels and more than 200 Chinese fishing boats entered the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai Islands.

As cross-strait tensions have escalated since 2024, Taiwan’s surrounding waters have become a proving ground for China's gray zone activity. 

Over 95% of Taiwan’s energy is imported, including 99% of the country's oil and natural gas. For this reason, Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to supply chain disruption.

Gray zone pressure is the new normal

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Chen Kuan-Ting (陳冠廷), a member of the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, told TCN that gray zone tactics are no longer isolated incidents, but part of an evolving pattern in which the frequency, intensity, and variety of methods are all increasing.

Drawing a parallel with Russia's annexation of Crimea, Chen said that normalizing coercive acts poses a serious threat, and if gray zone tactics become the status quo, then it will be harder to reverse them, and there will be a greater danger to Taiwan’s security.

On Feb. 14, 2024, an unregistered Chinese speedboat entered restricted waters near Kinmen and collided with a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel during an interdiction attempt. The collision killed two of the Chinese speedboat passengers.

The incident sparked a public outcry across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing then used the incident as a pretext to launch a series of “routine law enforcement patrols” in the waters surrounding Kinmen.

Professor Liu said he observed a marked escalation in China’s maritime gray zone activities targeting Taiwan following the speedboat incident, particularly involving the operations of the CCG. Such actions are increasingly extending into the broader Taiwan Strait area, signaling a strategic shift in Beijing’s posture, he added.

Taiwan’s Coast Guard conducted a boarding and inspection operation on a mainland Chinese vessel that entered restricted waters near Kinmen. (The Coast Guard Administration)
Taiwan’s Coast Guard conducts a boarding and inspection operation on a mainland Chinese vessel in restricted waters near Kinmen. (The Coast Guard Administration)


Professor Liu said CCG patrols have expanded their scope, gradually incorporating broader areas of the Taiwan Strait. While Chinese vessels have so far refrained from entering Taiwan’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, he said that the frequent confrontations require scientific, fact-based assessments to avoid unnecessary escalation.

In another incident in January 2025, an undersea cable near Keelung was severed by the Cameroon-flagged cargo ship Shunxin 39. Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) suspected Chinese sabotage.

In March 2025, TCSS, under the direction of Professor Liu and retired Admiral Chen Yeong-kang (陳永康), conducted a tabletop exercise to explore potential scenarios for a Chinese assault on Taiwan in 2029. One key scenario, in the exercise, involved the China Coast Guard (CCG) intercepting and redirecting vessels carrying energy supplies to Taiwan under the pretext of inspection—effectively imposing a blockade without formally declaring war.

The exercise showed that such tactics could constrain Taiwan’s energy resilience and potentially force political concessions.


Taiwan’s Coast Guard vessel CG607 was monitoring China Coast Guard ship No. 1302 in the waters off eastern Taiwan. (The Coast Guard Administration)
Taiwan’s Coast Guard vessel CG607 was monitoring China Coast Guard ship No. 1302 in the waters off eastern Taiwan. (The Coast Guard Administration)
Taiwan’s strategic and operational response

In addition to threatening Taiwan, China’s gray zone activities undermine the unity and security of countries along the First Island Chain. If Beijing gains control over the waters around Taiwan, it could shift the balance of power across the entire Indo-Pacific region.

China has increasingly asserted that the Taiwan Strait is part of its internal waters, using both official statements and policy moves to advance this claim. On June 13, 2022, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office declared that “China has sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait.”

In response to Beijing’s gray zone strategy, Taiwan has mostly adopted a defensive posture.

The CGA, typically the first responder to China’s maritime gray zone activities, told TCN that it adheres to the principle of “no provocation, no concession” in its operations.

Chen said that Taiwan supports the existing international order—not only as a supporter but also as a firm advocate—so it tends to avoid actions that might allow China to alter that order.

Chen stated that he supports increasing investment in Taiwan’s Coast Guard units to counter China’s growing use of gray zone tactics. If capability gaps arise due to the time required for procurement and construction, he said that Taiwan could look to the World War II-era Lend-Lease Act as a reference and consider leasing patrol vessels from the United States or other allies.

The budget for the CGA is expected to increase to NT$29.5 billion (approximately USD 980 million) in 2026.

At the operational level, the CGA and the Navy maintain a well-coordinated division of responsibilities

The CGA told TCN, "In accordance with the principles outlined in the support agreement signed with the Navy and related regulations, the Coast Guard Administration prioritizes responding to Chinese government and civilian vessels. Subject to available capacity, it will then support Navy-requested operations in line with policy directives, assisting the Navy in jointly addressing Chinese military vessels."

If a Chinese vessel is found entering Taiwan's prohibited or restricted waters without authorization, the CGA "will respond based on the suspicious signs and nature of the violation, taking actions such as expulsion, boarding inspections, or detention," CGA said.

If Chinese military vessels, coast guard ships, research vessels, or other official ships are detected approaching the outer boundary of Taiwan's 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone (restricted area), the CGA said that they "will immediately deploy frontline vessels to forward positions. We will then employ radio broadcasts in both Chinese and English, LED message boards, and close-distance shadowing to firmly deny them entry into our (Taiwan) waters."

As China’s gray zone tactics continue to evolve, Taiwan appears to be recognizing the need to stay prepared and resilient.