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Updated: Oct 21, 2025
Trump's China unification comment causes stir
By Chang Cheng-yun, TCN
7 MIN READ
Trump’s “unification and peace” remark has reignited debate over Taiwan’s role in US-China relations.
Following the US-China dialogue in Geneva, President Donald Trump addressed the media on May 14, discussing trade relations and stating that a fully open Chinese market would benefit both China and the United States, adding, “and I think it’s going to be great for unification and peace.”
The ambiguous remark prompted swift clarification from Washington. The US Department of State issued a statement affirming that “US policy on Taiwan remains the same.” The American Institute in Taiwan reiterated that the US approach toward Taiwan has been consistent across decades and administrations.
Understanding Trump 2.0 from Taiwan’s perspective
Among Taiwan’s strategic and policymaking circles, Trump’s second term is approached with caution. While his Taiwan policy has yet to show significant shifts, his unpredictability remains a source of concern.
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Legislator Wang Ting-yu (王定宇), a senior member of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan, told TCN that without re-election pressure and with a stronger grasp of the US government apparatus, Trump is likely to lean further into his characteristic unpredictability, loyalty-based appointments, and “America First” ideology.
Dr. Alexander C. Huang (黃介正), a professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, told TCN that Trump’s core worldview remains unchanged, and the US has overextended globally, neglecting its own economic health. Trump seeks to reverse this by pulling back from costly international engagements and revitalizing domestic industry—a strategy that can be described as “selective strategic retrenchment,” Huang explained
Trump’s policies, such as opposing large-scale foreign aid and prioritizing trade deficit reduction, reflect a belief that the US has been taken advantage of. According to Huang, these views remain consistent from Trump 1.0 to Trump 2.0.
While Trump’s personal doctrine is familiar, the global context has changed. China is closing the power gap with the US, creating a more bipolar world order and intensifying strategic competition.
Huang notes that within the US strategic community, a growing anxiety is evident, and many concern that while the US has stagnated, China’s power is accelerating at an alarming pace. Huang indicated that Trump’s solution is twofold: slow China externally via trade and diplomatic tactics, and revive America’s industrial strength internally through reindustrialization.
Taiwan’s reaction to the US strategic adjustment
From a long-term view, the US retrenchment strategy may improve competitiveness, but it seems to introduce short-term uncertainty for allies—particularly Taiwan, which finds itself at the epicenter of rising US-China tensions.
A Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll in April 2025 found that 57.2% of respondents did not consider the Trump-led US a trustworthy partner. Nearly 43% of those polled doubted that the US was more reliable than China.
Similarly, a Brookings Institution survey showed that only 23.1% of Taiwanese respondents saw the US as a dependable ally, with 46.7% believing the US would not intervene if China attacked.
These polls point to rising anxiety—not only about China’s power but also about the potential for US disengagement.
If Taiwan falls under Beijing’s control, the surrounding Taiwan Strait—particularly Japan and the United States—would face significant strategic pressure and heightened alert. Pictured is Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. (Facebook US Air Force)
Taiwan’s strategic importance remains unchanged
Despite public unease, Taiwan still holds enduring strategic value for the United States. Professor Huang argues that no formal “abandon Taiwan” policy exists in Washington, though contingency planning is increasing.
He cited a 2023 US Department of Defense–commissioned report titled “The World After Taiwan’s Fall,” noting that while not evidence of abandonment, it illustrates Washington’s growing strategic realism.
Taiwan remains irreplaceable in the first island chain—flanked by the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, Subic Bay, and Okinawa. Its location places it at the crossroads of critical maritime and geopolitical zones, Huang added.
Legislator Wang said that Taiwan cannot be bypassed in any military movement through the Miyako Strait or Bashi Channel. As such, Taiwan is vital to US Indo-Pacific security strategy, linking three key hotspots: the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea.
Dr. Huang explained that if China were to occupy Taiwan—or if the US lost strategic access—the American defense posture in the region would be compromised. PLA deployment in Taiwan could bring Chinese forces alarmingly close to Japan, drastically raising regional tensions, Huang mentioned.
Huang added that it is crucial to distinguish between a voluntary US withdrawal and a failed attempt to defend Taiwan, as the consequences for allied trust differ significantly between the two scenarios
Legislator Wang further argues that Taiwan’s relevance extends beyond geography, in which is a cornerstone of the global semiconductor supply chain—particularly as democracies seek “non-red” alternatives to China-centric industrial ecosystems.
Wang said that Taiwan also represents democratic values. If democratic Taiwan were to fall to authoritarian China, it would deal a profound blow to global liberal values, Wang suggested.
As Brookings expert Ryan Hass put it, “America’s foremost interest is in upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
Taiwan’s strategic significance radiates beyond the Strait to the entire Western Pacific.
How Taiwan is strengthening its hand
Despite its strategic value, Taiwan acknowledges the changing rhetoric in US diplomacy. “There’s no free lunch” is now a guiding policy principle, Huang indicated.
Dr. Huang said that the message from Washington is crystal clear—"unless you show me that you're willing to fight to the end, I won’t sacrifice for you.” Simply put, the US expects Taiwan to demonstrate both a credible will and capacity for self-defense.
President Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) administration has heard this message. In June 2024, Lai created three new committees under the Office of the President, including the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, to enhance Taiwan’s emergency preparedness and resilience.
Taiwan’s 2025 defense budget has already reached a record high, and the 2026 budget is projected to climb even further, reaching a peak of 3.32% of the nation’s GDP.
Professor Tso Chen-Dong (左正東) of Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University told TCN that Lai’s government has clearly signaled a more proactive posture than its predecessor, especially in increasing defense spending. This shift has not gone unnoticed in Washington. These moves reduce the likelihood of Taiwan being viewed as a strategic liability, Tso said.
Professor Tso added that Taiwan must convince the international community it has a credible chance of prevailing in a crisis—something that requires not just increased defense spending, but also tangible improvements in combat readiness. He also suggested that Taiwan should consider a dual-track strategy, maintaining its own strategic autonomy to pursue more stable and constructive cross-Strait relations—an approach currently lacking in the Lai administration.
While consensus exists on the need for self-defense, views differ on implementation. The DPP criticizes the opposition for freezing or cutting parts of the defense budget. The opposition argues that budget scrutiny ensures effectiveness rather than symbolic spending.
Dr. Huang said that buying more weapons does not equal increased fighting power, and true strength comes from well-trained, well-equipped, and well-retained forces.
Taiwan’s defense faces manpower challenges. Recruitment and retention are lagging, and military academies struggle to attract candidates. Huang warns, “If we don’t fix this, even the best weapons won’t help. The US will think Taiwan isn’t serious.”
Improved military pay, along with enhanced US-Taiwan cooperation in training, maintenance, and domestic arms production, may help to strengthen Taiwan’s defense posture.
In June 2025, the KMT and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) passed a reform that increased monthly volunteer soldier bonuses to NT$30,000. This move aims to improve retention and morale.
Legislator Wang pointed out that with Taiwan’s GDP now over US$800 billion, defense budgets should be based on real needs—not just GDP percentages. “We must define the capabilities we need first—then build the structure, and let the budget follow,” he said.
Although Taiwan still faces procurement challenges, much now depends on the willingness of allies—especially the US—to provide support, with discussions increasingly shifting beyond mere GDP percentages to focus on what Taiwan truly needs to deter China effectively, Wang indicated.
With advancements in Taiwan’s domestic defense industry and growing openness among other countries to transfer technology, the nation is moving closer to establishing a robust local defense manufacturing ecosystem, Wang said.
The US is also supporting Taiwan’s development of asymmetric warfare capabilities, Wang pointed out, including drones and precision munitions, and is open to establishing production facilities in Taiwan—a significant breakthrough.
What Taiwan needs is an enhancement of combat capability, not merely the procurement of equipment. (Military News Agency)
Changing US-Taiwan relations
Taiwan’s strategic value to the US remains intact—even enhanced—under Trump’s renewed political influence. However, the US-China rivalry will continue to shape the framework within which US-Taiwan relations evolve.
Professor Huang suggested that until a new equilibrium between the United States and China takes shape, the parameters of US-Taiwan relations—both their limits and potential—will remain uncertain.
The upcoming Xi-Trump summit could prove to be a turning point, not only for US-China dynamics but also for Taiwan’s strategic future.
Huang urged policymakers in Taipei to closely scrutinize Trump’s language following the summit. A shift from phrases like “not support Taiwan independence” to more assertive wording such as “oppose Taiwan independence,” or diplomatic formulations like “we support peaceful resolution across the Strait and do not oppose any agreement both sides accept,” could indicate significant changes in US strategic posture, Huang suggested.
Should such rhetoric materialize, Taiwan must respond with exceptional care and clarity of purpose.
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