Ten events that defined Taiwan’s politics and security in 2025

Looking back on 2025, Taiwan’s security and economy came under unprecedented strain. Domestically, a political landscape in which the ruling Democratic Progressive Party held only a minority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, while the opposition controlled a majority, fueled intense mobilization and sharpened partisan confrontation. Internationally, pressure from Beijing continued to build, while the US under President Donald Trump’s second administration began reshaping the regional and global order.

Against this backdrop, TCN has compiled the key context behind ten major events that defined Taiwan’s year.

1. Taiwan’s March National Security Meeting

President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) on March 13, 2025, chaired his first high-level National Security Council meeting since taking office, formally declaring that China meets the definition of a “foreign hostile force” under Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act.

Speaking at a press conference after the meeting, Lai reiterated his long-held position that “The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.”

Taiwan’s national security agencies subsequently announced a series of follow-up measures. These included restoring the system of military courts, reviewing whether military personnel, civil servants, and teachers hold identification cards issued by the People’s Republic of China, and tightening entry restrictions on individuals linked to China’s United Front activities.

Beijing reacted swiftly. The Taiwan Affairs Office condemned the moves and warned that if “Taiwan independence” forces cross a red line, China would be compelled to take “resolute measures.”

The developments further strained cross-strait relations, narrowing the already limited space for exchanges and eroding mutual trust. 

This shift also helped pave the way for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) drills conducted around Taiwan in April.

2. PLA military exercises around Taiwan

Shortly after Taiwan’s March national security meeting that redefined China’s status, the PLA Eastern Theater Command launched joint exercises around Taiwan from April 1 to 2 under the codename “Strait Thunder—2025A.”

The PLA aimed to conduct “no-warning, multi-directional close-in operations,” making the exercises resemble real-combat scenarios more closely. The PLA’s deployment of aircraft carriers, bombers, and long-range strike platforms was seen as a simulation of blocking external intervention, indicating a shift from political signaling toward a potential “blockade and strike” scenario.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) said it maintained close surveillance throughout the exercises and carried out an unplanned immediate readiness drill to demonstrate its ability to rapidly transition from peacetime to wartime posture and raise overall readiness levels.

The April exercises were intended not only as a response to statements from President Lai Ching-te’s administration, but also as a stress test of the broader international environment. 

By staging frequent and easily repeatable drills, Beijing is seen as attempting to normalize military pressure, compelling Taiwan to accelerate improvements in early warning systems, mobilization capacity, and societal resilience. 

The heightened security atmosphere is also expected to form part of the backdrop for Taiwan’s National Defense Report and defense budget debates later in the year.

3. Tariff shock

On April 2, US President Donald Trump announced a new “Liberation Day” tariff policy that briefly placed Taiwan on a punitive tariff list, with proposed rates of up to 32 percent. The move caught Taiwan’s industry and policymakers by surprise.

The tariffs differed from traditional trade disputes by carrying a stronger element of political leverage. Trump linked US trade deficits to semiconductor supply-chain interests and tied Taiwan’s tariff treatment to conditions related to investment in the United States and other commitments.

Taiwan later dispatched a negotiating team to Washington to seek a reduction in the tariff rate and assurances that further tariffs would not be imposed. 

In an interview with CBC on Oct. 17, Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) said Taiwan had pledged not only to continue TSMC’s investments in the United States, but also to support the expansion of the broader semiconductor ecosystem, including suppliers and other chipmakers.

Talks between Taipei and Washington are continuing, with an outcome not expected until 2026.

4. Hai Kun’s sea trials

On June 17, Taiwan’s domestically built prototype submarine Hai Kun departed Kaohsiung Port for its first Sea Acceptance Test (SAT), marking a major milestone in the Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program.

The vessel completed its fourth sea trial on Nov. 27, with sailing time exceeding eight hours, signaling steady progress in testing. Although the Hai Kun was originally scheduled for delivery to the Navy in November as planned, it has been confirmed that the handover will not take place this year due to ongoing testing requirements and various technical adjustments.

During a special report to the Legislative Yuan in October, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo Li-hsiung (顧立雄) stated that the Hai Kun project would proceed step-by-step and in a gradual manner. He emphasized that the full-vessel performance verification must be completed under the prerequisites of absolute safety and guaranteed quality to ensure the submarine meets all operational requirements and combat specifications. However, the MND did not provide a definitive updated date for the final delivery.

The performance of Hai Kun is seen as critical not only to strengthening Taiwan’s naval capabilities but also to sustaining public confidence in the broader IDS program and the nation’s push for greater defense self-reliance.

5. The failed wave of mass recalls

In the first half of 2025, a wave of mass recall campaigns significantly shaped Taiwan’s political climate. Following the 2024 general elections, Taiwan entered a political configuration in which the ruling party held only a minority of seats, while the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) together controlled a majority in the Legislative Yuan. This opposition bloc pushed through several key measures, including amendments to the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures and a package of bills expanding the legislature’s oversight powers.

Members of the pan-Green camp criticized the moves as encroaching on executive authority and launched the “Bluebird Movement” in protest. Civic groups opposed to the opposition parties then initiated recall petitions against several KMT lawmakers, escalating political confrontation from the legislative chamber to the streets.

A total of 31 constituencies cleared the signature threshold to move to the voting stage. Large-scale recall ballots were held in July and August, but all ultimately failed to pass, bringing the campaign to an end.

As the executive branch advanced plans for a defense special budget, industrial restructuring and societal resilience initiatives, it was forced to contend simultaneously with heightened political confrontation and public division, raising the broader cost of governance.

6. Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report

On Oct. 9, one day ahead of President Lai Ching-te’s National Day address, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) released the first National Defense Report of the Lai administration. The report focuses on building “agile and resilient armed forces” and notes that the People’s Republic of China’s gray-zone coercion against Taiwan has become normalized. It argues that Taiwan must respond through multi-domain deterrence, asymmetric capabilities, and decentralized operations—an approach summarized in the operational guideline of “Multi-Domain Deterrence and Resilient Defense.”

The report upgrades international cooperation and all-of-society defense into standalone chapters, placing stronger emphasis on Lai’s “Four Pillars of Peace”: strengthening national defense, enhancing economic security, deepening partnerships with democratic nations and maintaining stable, principled cross-strait leadership.

The document outlines the direction of the administration’s defense policy and the broader strategic framework guiding Taiwan’s self-defense.

7. Defense spending breaks through 3% of GDP

In his National Day address on Oct. 10, 2025, President Lai Ching-te announced that Taiwan’s defense spending would exceed 3 percent of GDP in 2026, with a long-term goal of raising the ratio to 5 percent by 2030. Lai also pledged to accelerate development of the “Taiwan Defense Dome (T-Dome),” a plan to build a highly integrated, real-time air-defense network.

In August, the Executive Yuan approved the central government budget for fiscal 2026, which allocates NT$949.5 billion (US$31.3 billion) for national defense. The figure represents 3.32 percent of GDP, a historic high.

Beyond the annual allocation, Lai said on Nov. 26 that China hopes to be ready to attack Taiwan by 2027, and announced plans for an additional eight-year special defense budget totaling NT$1.25 trillion (about US$40 billion). The funds are earmarked for the Taiwan Defense Dome, high-technology and artificial-intelligence applications, expansion of the domestic defense industry and greater self-reliance in weapons systems.

The large-scale special budget provides stable, medium- to long-term investment in defense, strengthens international security cooperation and signals Taiwan’s commitment to self-protection. However, the spending proposals remain stalled in the Legislative Yuan amid partisan confrontation and have yet to receive formal review.

8. Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s “Taiwan contingency” remarks

On Nov. 7, Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae said during questioning in the Diet that if a military conflict or maritime blockade were to occur in the Taiwan Strait, such a development would “very likely constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan.

Under Japan’s security legislation, a designation of “survival-threatening situation” provides the legal basis for exercising the right of collective self-defense, allowing Japan to conduct joint military operations with allies, including the United States.

Takaichi later softened her wording in December, saying any determination would require a “comprehensive judgment” based on conditions at the time. Yet, she refused to retract her original remarks.

It was the first time a Japanese leader had explicitly linked a Taiwan conflict to potential Japanese military involvement in a formal Diet setting, marking a shift away from Tokyo’s past strategic ambiguity.

China issued a strong protest and demanded that Takaichi withdraw her comments. Beijing also rolled out countermeasures, including advising its citizens to avoid traveling to Japan, allowing up to 46 China–Japan air routes to fall to zero flights, and conducting targeted PLA exercises in the Yellow Sea.

The repercussions from Takaichi’s “Taiwan contingency” remarks are still unfolding and could further reshape relations among Taiwan, the US, China, and Japan.

9. Trump–Xi interactions

In 2025, Taiwan briefly surfaced as a topic in interactions between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).

In an Aug. 15 interview with Fox News, Trump said Xi had told him that as long as Trump remained president, China would not invade Taiwan. On Oct. 30, Trump and Xi met in Busan, South Korea. Although Taiwan was expected to be discussed, later reports indicated the issue was not raised. 

Rising tensions between Japan and China in mid-November over Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency prompted further outreach. On Nov. 24, Trump held separate calls with Xi and Takaichi.

According to Beijing’s readout of the Trump–Xi call, Xi said Taiwan’s return to China was an important part of the post-war international order, and noted that China and the US had once fought side by side against fascism and militarism. He said both countries should now jointly uphold the outcomes of World War II. The US side did not issue a matching statement, but did not publicly dispute Beijing’s account.

Later the same day, Trump spoke by phone with Takaichi. Media reports said Trump asked the Japanese leader not to interfere in the Taiwan issue.

Trump is expected to visit China in April 2026, and Taiwan is again expected to be on the agenda during talks.

10. 2025 US National Security Strategy

The White House on Dec. 4 released the first National Security Strategy (NSS) of President Donald Trump’s second term, identifying the prevention of conflict in the Taiwan Strait as a top-tier priority.

The 2025 NSS underscores Taiwan’s critical role in the global landscape, specifically citing its dominance in semiconductor manufacturing and its strategic geographic location. 

The strategy warns that a military move by China would trigger severe economic consequences, framing the maintenance of a US military advantage as the primary tool for deterrence.

While the NSS reaffirms the US commitment to regional stability, it introduces a pointed call for collective responsibility. The strategy urges allies to shoulder a greater share of defense costs, signaling a continuation of the administration’s "America First" approach to international security arrangements.

On the diplomatic front, Washington maintains its long-standing position on cross-strait relations. The document explicitly states that the United States opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side.