Taiwan’s Ukraine drone debate: Experts’ clash as US security voices urge closer cooperation

Washington-linked security figures are pressing Taiwan to study Ukraine’s wartime drone ecosystem more closely, but Taiwanese scholars and defense observers are increasingly split over how far — and how fast — Taipei is actually deepening its cooperation with Kyiv.

Ukraine’s wartime lessons echo in Taiwan

Speaking at the annual forum hosted May 8 by the Taipei-based think tank CAPRI, former White House deputy national security adviser Matt Pottinger stated Taiwan should learn from Ukraine’s wartime experience rather than from the United States.

Ukraine manufactures an estimated 12 million drones a year, Pottinger noted, while the US may produce only around 300,000 military and commercial drones combined. The drone innovator Taiwan should be looking to, he said, is Kyiv — not Washington.

Pottinger argued that Taiwan’s current defense procurement mentality remains dangerously out of sync with modern warfare. While Ukrainian forces adapt drone and counter-drone technologies every few weeks on the battlefield, Taiwan is still debating which weapons to buy, he said.

Pottinger repeatedly invoked Ukraine as a model for asymmetric defense. Ukrainian sea drones sinking Russian warships in the Black Sea, he argued, demonstrated how relatively inexpensive technologies can constrain even major naval powers.

He added that the conflict in Iran reinforces the same point. US military vessels have transited the Strait of Hormuz only a handful of times in recent weeks, he said, due to concerns about asymmetric threats.

Taiwan, he said, should emulate Ukraine’s rapidly iterative defense ecosystem and invest in defensive interception systems and, offensive strike capabilities capable of deterring Beijing. He further urged Taiwan to invite Ukrainian and other foreign experts to demonstrate how drones and missiles can be manufactured and adapted quickly under wartime conditions.

Pottinger told TCN that he believes Taiwan has a chance to defeat its adversaries, but must strengthen its capabilities and remain alert to global military developments, including those Beijing is monitoring. He added that effective air defense requires a combination of advanced interceptors and low-cost anti-drone systems.

For Pottinger, deterrence is not merely a matter of rhetoric or diplomacy, but of industrial resilience. Taiwan, he argued, must become a porcupine  — one capable of innovating, adapting, and imposing costs on an adversary.

Drones in the GPS-denied battlefield

That sense of urgency was echoed by Brandon Tseng, co-founder of defense technology company Shield AI.

In the latest episode of the Taiwan Frontlines podcast launched by TCN and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Tseng argued that Taiwan’s most important takeaway from Ukraine should be the inevitability of electronic warfare.

In any conflict involving China, Taiwan, the United States, and regional allies, he said, an early move would likely be jamming GPS and communications systems. He urged Taiwan’s military leadership to rigorously assess whether any drone or weapons platform could operate in a communications-denied environment before purchasing it, and encouraged Taiwan to consult Ukrainians directly about battlefield lessons.

Tseng also offered a more nuanced assessment of Ukraine’s drone success. Ukraine has excelled at producing tactical drones — quadcopters and one-way attack systems capable of shaping the battlefield within a roughly 30-kilometer radius, he argued — but has been less effective at conducting sustained strategic strikes deep behind enemy lines.

The United States, by contrast, specializes in strategic-level capabilities, he said. Taiwan should therefore not merely replicate Ukraine’s tactical drone model, Tseng argued, but develop a full-spectrum drone architecture spanning tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities.

Scholars question the depth of existing cooperation

While American security voices increasingly advocate deeper Taiwan-Ukraine cooperation, several Taiwanese experts interviewed by TCN painted a more ambivalent picture — one marked by bureaucratic hesitation, geopolitical caution, and competing institutional interests.

Cheng Cheng-ping (鄭政秉), a Taiwanese professor who previously conducted exchanges in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro and later witnessed wartime conditions there firsthand after Russia’s invasion, told TCN that practical cooperation between Taiwan and Ukraine remains far below what many publicly suggest.

Cheng said he agrees with Pottinger’s call for a closer Taiwan-Ukraine relationship in relevant fields but does not believe Taiwan is doing nearly enough.

“People may exaggerate certain exchanges or partnerships,” Cheng said, “but in reality, cooperation is still insufficient.”

He stated that Taiwan should collaborate with Ukraine not only on drones, but across multiple sectors. Taiwan possesses strong engineering capabilities, he said, while Ukraine offers invaluable combat-tested experience because nearly every technology developed there must survive real battlefield conditions.

Yet Cheng described multiple obstacles impeding closer ties.

Official and semi-official Taiwanese engagement in Ukraine remains limited, he said, and even humanitarian and reconstruction-oriented NGO initiatives have at times reportedly been discouraged by Taiwanese officials due to security concerns.

He told TCN that some Taiwanese officials had purportedly conveyed that Washington prefers Taipei not become too deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs at the governmental level, leaving most engagement to civil society.

Taiwanese corporations and universities, Cheng added, often view drones primarily as commercial opportunities rather than national security imperatives. Internal rivalries, competition for turf, and concerns over jeopardizing business interests in China can further constrain cooperation with Ukraine, he said.

As a result, smaller firms rather than major industrial players frequently handle drone-related collaborations between the two nations, Cheng said. He said this falls short because smaller firms remain limited in their production capacities.

Cheng’s conclusion was blunt: Taiwan, in his view, remains substantially less prepared for war than Ukraine — and even less prepared than countries such as Poland, Sweden, and Czechia.

Two additional experts who requested anonymity raised similar concerns regarding the limits and ambiguities of Taiwan-Ukraine cooperation.

One Taiwanese expert who previously lived in Europe for many years told TCN that while Taiwan’s drone industry has begun paying far greater attention to wartime drone development, many stakeholders still lack a clear understanding of what Taiwan would actually need in a real conflict scenario.

As a result, the expert said, some actors risk approaching procurement and development reactively —  trying to replicate whichever drone models appear successful in Ukraine, rather than designing systems suited to Taiwan’s own operational environment and defense needs.

One Ukraine specialist told TCN that, to his understanding, Kyiv’s official policy still seeks to avoid overly visible collaboration with Taiwan in order to preserve stable relations with China.

DSET sees an emerging non-red supply chain

The Taipei-based think tank DSET, however, said Taiwan-Ukraine drone cooperation is already developing rapidly and making significant progress.

DSET released a policy report on April 22 highlighting accelerating collaboration among Taiwan, Ukraine, and Europe on drone supply chains.

According to DSET, Taiwan exported nearly 130,000 drones to Poland and Czechia in 2025, many of which were later transferred to Ukraine. During the first quarter of this year alone, exports to Europe reportedly surpassed 136,000 units — already exceeding last year’s annual total.

The report noted that Taiwanese components — including batteries, motors, flight control boards, and airframes — are increasingly embedded within Ukraine’s wartime drone ecosystem, contributing to what DSET described as the emergence of a “non-red supply chain” independent of Chinese manufacturing.

Still, DSET cautioned that Taiwan’s exports remain concentrated in relatively inexpensive small drones and are often driven by informal civilian procurement channels rather than stable government contracts. The think tank nevertheless advocated expanded Taiwan-Ukraine cooperation on interceptor drones and long-range strike drones aimed at strengthening deterrence.