Papua New Guinea national name on the map. (Shutterstock)

Papua New Guinea’s move to close Taiwan office signals expanding Chinese pressure, experts say

Papua New Guinea’s abrupt move to close Taiwan’s representative office reflects Beijing’s increasingly stringent demands under its “one China principle,” Taiwanese experts said, warning of wider risks to Taipei's unofficial ties.

Papua New Guinea announces closure

On July 16, Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko reaffirmed his country’s “one China policy” and unexpectedly announced the immediate closure of Taipei Economic Office in Papua New Guinea.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) subsequently lodged a strong protest, saying Papua New Guinea had made the decision without prior consultation with Taipei.

The ministry said Taiwan would not accept the Papua New Guinean government’s unilateral announcement, adding that its representative office would continue operating normally while Taipei pursued negotiations with Port Moresby to safeguard Taiwan’s rights and interests.

Taiwan–Papua New Guinea economic ties

Taiwan imports approximately 1.2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas from Papua New Guinea annually, while timber and minerals are also among its major imports from the country.

Taiwan also provides emergency medical evacuation services and agricultural technical assistance to Papua New Guinea and serves as an important export market for the Pacific island country.

Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) said on July 18 that the government would review Taiwan–Papua New Guinea economic relations, including Taiwan’s purchases of Papua New Guinean natural gas, before deciding on any necessary response.


Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung says Taiwan will continue to review its economic, trade and cooperative relations with Papua New Guinea. (NOWNEWS Chen Yun-nien)
Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung says Taiwan will continue to review its economic, trade and cooperative relations with Papua New Guinea. (NOWNEWS Chen Yun-nien)

A diplomatic warning

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a professor in the Department of Political Science at National Cheng Kung University, told TCN that Papua New Guinea’s unilateral announcement reflected Beijing’s efforts to gradually tighten the requirements imposed on other countries under its “one China principle.”

Chinese pressure is also expanding beyond Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies to countries that do not maintain official relations with Taipei, Wang said. As a result, Taiwan could face mounting challenges to maintaining international engagement through unofficial channels.

Sun Kuo-hsiang (孫國祥), a professor in the Department of International Affairs and Business at Nanhua University, expressed a similar view.

Sun told TCN that Beijing’s diplomatic pressure against Taiwan had expanded from persuading its diplomatic allies to switch recognition to restricting Taiwan’s representative offices in countries without formal relations with Taipei.

The move also demonstrated how China was using investment, foreign assistance and market access to secure political compliance, particularly in Pacific island countries with relatively fragile institutions and heavy dependence on external funding, Sun said.

Wang said countries adopting a “one China policy” had traditionally been required primarily to recognize the government in Beijing and refrain from maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Such policies did not necessarily require them to terminate economic, cultural or other functional exchanges with Taipei.

The Papua New Guinea case, however, indicated that China was gradually expanding its demands under the “one China principle,” Wang said.

Sun said adopting a “one China policy” did not necessarily require a country to close Taiwan’s representative office. Papua New Guinea’s decision represented a maximalist interpretation of Beijing’s version of the “one China principle,” he said.

Competition in the South Pacific

Wang said Papua New Guinea’s decision also highlighted intensifying competition among major powers in the South Pacific.

Papua New Guinea had previously signed a defense agreement with Australia, and its action against Taiwan might have been intended to balance its deepening security ties with Canberra by reassuring Beijing, Wang said.


Oliver Liao (廖文哲), then head of Taiwan’s representative office in Papua New Guinea, donates rice in 2021 to a program supporting street children. (Taipei Economic Office in Papua New Guinea)
Oliver Liao (廖文哲), then head of Taiwan’s representative office in Papua New Guinea, donates rice in 2021 to a program supporting street children. (Taipei Economic Office in Papua New Guinea)

Potential domino effect

Asked whether Papua New Guinea’s unilateral decision could trigger a domino effect for Taiwan’s diplomatic presence, Wang said many countries were unlikely to follow suit immediately.

Each country's ties with Taiwan, domestic political environment, and relations with the United States, Japan and Australia differ, Wang said. Papua New Guinea’s situation therefore could not be directly applied to other countries.

However, Wang warned that the case could encourage similar moves. 

If Papua New Guinea faced no substantial diplomatic or economic costs after closing Taiwan’s representative office, China could cite the case as a precedent when lobbying or pressuring other countries without formal relations with Taiwan to take similar action, Wang said.

Sun offered a similar assessment, saying the incident was unlikely to produce a broad domino effect in the short term because countries differed in the legal foundations governing Taiwan’s representative offices, their economic interests and their dependence on China.

However, it could produce a “selective domino effect,” Sun said.

Beijing was likely to use Papua New Guinea as a model to pressure other countries heavily dependent on Chinese investment or assistance to rename or downgrade Taiwan’s representative offices, relocate them outside national capitals, or close them altogether, he said.

Experts’ recommendations

Sun recommended that Taiwan adopt a three-track strategy centered on negotiation, leverage and diversification.

First, Taipei should immediately engage directly with Papua New Guinea’s senior political leadership, including the prime minister, Cabinet and parliament, Sun said.

Second, Taiwan should make appropriate use of its natural gas purchases as leverage but avoid abruptly suspending imports, which could violate long-term contracts or jeopardize Taiwan’s own energy security, Sun said.

Sun also called on Taiwan to coordinate with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and European countries to apply collective pressure.

Wang said Taiwan should continue diplomatic negotiations and demand that the Papua New Guinean government formally explain the legal basis, administrative procedures and specific reasons for closing the office.


Oliver Liao, then head of Taiwan’s representative office in Papua New Guinea, donates wheelchairs and crutches on Taiwan’s behalf to Papua New Guinea’s Ministry of Health in 2022. (Taipei Economic Office in Papua New Guinea)
Oliver Liao, then head of Taiwan’s representative office in Papua New Guinea, donates wheelchairs and crutches on Taiwan’s behalf to Papua New Guinea’s Ministry of Health in 2022. (Taipei Economic Office in Papua New Guinea)

If Papua New Guinea could take such action without a transparent process or formal explanation, other countries might adopt similar methods in heir relations with Taiwan, Wang said.

Taiwan’s demand for a formal explanation was therefore not only intended to protect its own rights and interests but also to underscore the importance of established norms in international relations and proper administrative procedures, he added.

Wang also described economic relations as an important source of negotiating leverage, including natural gas purchases and other cooperation programs. However, any measures should be carefully targeted rather than constituting broad or emotionally driven retaliation.

Taiwan should also expand multilateral cooperation to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents, Wang said.

Taipei should seek to incorporate its bilateral cooperation with South Pacific countries into multilateral frameworks involving Australia, Japan, the United States and other like-minded partners.

Making individual projects part of broader multilateral programs would require countries considering measures against Taiwan to also assess the effects on other partners and the wider diplomatic costs, Wang said.

Preparing for future risks

Wang said the government should assess the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s representative offices in countries without formal diplomatic relations, identify the countries most susceptible to Chinese pressure and determine which offices were most at risk. 

Taiwan should also develop contingency plans to continue providing remote consular services and assistance to Taiwanese businesses and nationals if an office were forced to close. The government should consider whether Taiwan’s missions in neighboring countries could provide emergency support, he said.

Sun expressed similar view, saying that the government should comprehensively review the legal foundations of its overseas representative offices, host countries’ dependence on China and the political risks the offices ace.

Taiwan should establish an early-warning list, designate alternative locations for consular services and develop digital service mechanisms, he said.