Lai softens cross-strait rhetoric in National Day address, but experts see little chance of breakthrough

President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) delivered his third National Day address on Oct. 10, placing less emphasis on the political status of cross-strait relations. Experts said that while Lai extended goodwill, there was little prospect of a breakthrough in the near term.

Lai’s remarks

Lai said China continues using military maneuvers and gray-zone tactics to unilaterally alter the cross-strait status quo. Resisting this authoritarian push, he argued, is vital not only to Taiwan’s survival, but to defending the international principle that force must not override self-determination.

Lai stated that Taiwan's rising defense spending aims to deter conflict rather than provoke it, adding that a stronger defense supports — rather than replaces — equal and dignified dialogue.

Lai welcomed US-China efforts to manage competition and mitigate conflict risks, but noted that regional stability hinges on an accurate understanding of World War II history and respecting the Taiwanese people's right to exist.

Vowing not to let authoritarianism erode democracy or fear replace freedom, Lai said Taiwan is taking resolute, responsible action to safeguard peace across the strait and the wider Indo-Pacific.

In a notable shift from previous years, Lai softened his focus on cross-strait sovereignty, omitting the sharp political rhetoric of his 2024 “non-subordination” stance and his 2025 pushback against Beijing’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758.

Adopted in 1971, UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the People’s Republic of China as China's sole legitimate representative at the United Nations, expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek to settle the question of UN representation.

Beijing’s response

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office denounced the speech, alleging that Lai was pursuing "Taiwan independence through military force" and reliance on external powers while undermining regional peace with a false "democracy versus authoritarianism" narrative.

China began military exercises in at least five areas across the Bohai, Yellow, East, and South China seas on Oct. 12, with exercises scheduled to run through Oct. 17.

Defense Minister Koo Li-hsiung (顧立雄) said Taiwan is tracking the People's Liberation Army's live-fire coastal drills and bracing for worst-case scenarios, saying Beijing's recurrent exercises destabilize the Indo-Pacific and deserve global condemnation.

No fundamental shift in policy

Wang Hung-jen (王宏仁), a professor in the Department of Political Science at National Cheng Kung University, told TCN that Lai’s address did not mark a fundamental change in cross-strait policy, but reflected an adjustment in how the government presented its position.

Comparing Lai’s three National Day addresses, Wang noted that the 2024 speech focused on Taiwan’s sovereignty, while the 2025 remarks targeted Beijing's challenges to the status quo and its distortion of World War II history. This year, Wang said, Lai synthesized those positions into a cohesive framework balancing status-quo deterrence with calls for peaceful dialogue.

Ma Chun-wei (馬準威), an assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, offered a similar assessment.

Ma told TCN that the speech's lighter cross-strait focus reflects domestic political strategy rather than a change in cross-strait policy. 

Because Lai had already cemented his positions — such as mutual non-subordination and areas for potential cooperation — in earlier addresses, he pivoted toward domestic economic gains to appeal to voters ahead of local elections, Ma added.

Wang noted Lai’s defense-and-dialogue stance as a key policy message, arguing that pitching higher military spending as deterrence rather than provocation supports his view that Taipei is preserving the status quo, not closing the door to cross-strait talks.

By linking democratic values and governance with international responsibility, Lai aimed to position Taiwan not merely as a target of Chinese intimidation, but as a constructive partner capable of bolstering regional and global stability, Wang said.

Rather than representing a change in cross-strait policy, Wang said, the speech showed how Lai’s administration was adjusting its domestic and international messaging while maintaining its existing policy position.

Cross-strait relations

Wang said cross-strait relations were likely to remain tense in the near term, although limited easing or a resumption of exchanges remained possible.

The core obstacle, he argued, is that Beijing’s approach toward Lai is not swayed merely by rhetoric, as China continues to demand that any dialogue conform to its own political framework.

Lai moderated his rhetoric and held out an olive branch for dialogue, but Beijing responded with familiar hostility, Wang noted, answering Taipei's restrained posture with renewed rhetoric and military intimidation.

Wang argued that room for dialogue remains, as neither Washington nor Beijing wants cross-strait frictions to spiral out of control. Rather than an outright rupture, he expects a bifurcated relationship defined by continued political and military standoff alongside gradual revivals of economic, civic, and cultural exchanges.

Wang argued that the real test remains whether Beijing will engage in substantive dialogue without demanding Taiwan yield to its political claims, warning that any temporary detente without such flexibility represents no real breakthrough.

Ma also saw little prospect of a near-term breakthrough, noting that while eased US-China tensions and ongoing summits between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping (習近平) might moderate targeted military pressure, Beijing’s maritime gray-zone incursions are likely to persist.

Impact of the Trump-Xi meeting

Ma said Lai’s decision not to mention Resolution 2758 in his speech, while calling for an end to distortions of World War II history, may be directly connected to the Trump-Xi meeting.

From the perspective of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Ma said Beijing’s recent historical narratives on Taiwan Retrocession Day and the anti-Japanese war presume the Republic of China (ROC) has ceased to exist and been wholly inherited by Beijing. By contrast, he noted, Taipei maintains that the ROC never vanished, but rather evolved into the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Resolution 2758 settled only China’s UN seat without addressing ROC or Taiwan’s participation, Ma noted, adding that debates over the island’s "undetermined status" closely track shifts in US policy. 

If verified, he said, reports that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty was temporarily pulled from display at the US National Archives during the Trump-Xi summit could signal a subtle, temporary softening in Washington’s stance on the issue.

While the Trump-Xi summit yielded no new consensus on Taiwan, Ma noted this outcome was not necessarily negative for Taipei, given initial anxieties that Trump might make an unprompted, damaging concession.

However, Ma cautioned that Taiwan must stay vigilant for unexpected remarks in future summits, particularly if shifting trade talks or commercial interests influence Trump’s posture.

Beijing’s pressure becomes routine

Wang said Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan had become increasingly institutionalized and routine, a trend that did not depend entirely on the wording Lai used in his National Day address.

China’s military pressure is no longer just a reaction to specific political events, Wang said, but an institutionalized tool designed to gradually reshape the cross-strait status quo.

This amounts to a strategy of attrition, Wang added, allowing Beijing to drain Taiwan’s defense resources and constrict its security space without resorting to direct conflict.

Even though Lai’s speech placed greater emphasis on peace, dialogue and maintaining the status quo, Wang said, Beijing might not stop applying pressure because its policy objectives had not changed.

Ma agreed, pointing to Beijing’s unwavering demand for the "1992 Consensus" as the core obstacle in its Taiwan policy. Given China’s categorical position, Ma said, Beijing treats any refusal to embrace the framework as deliberate avoidance, rendering any conciliatory gestures from Taipei largely irrelevant in its eyes.

The KMT has traditionally defined the “1992 Consensus” as an understanding between Taipei and Beijing that there is only one China, but each side may interpret what "China" means. In that formulation, “China” means the ROC. The existence and meaning of such a consensus are disputed.

“Changes in tone can at most affect the emotional response; they cannot fundamentally resolve the long-standing political impasse across the Taiwan Strait,” Ma said.